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TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION AS A 
“GREAT POWER” 
DANIEL RICE† 
ABSTRACT 
  The Roberts Court has recently begun reviving a long-latent 
structural constitutional principle—that some unenumerated powers 
are too important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. Under this abstractly sensible theory, some powers are too 
“great” to have been conferred by implication alone. This structural 
logic seems poised to command majority holdings in the Supreme 
Court. But it is largely unclear what results so undertheorized a 
concept might dictate. Now is the time to survey the domain of “great 
powers” in service of developing an appropriately modest and 
judicially enforceable great-powers doctrine. 
  This Note argues that a power to annex foreign territory is too 
important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Because the Constitution does not enumerate a territorial-acquisition 
power, Congress therefore disregarded great-powers limitations in 
annexing Texas and Hawaii through joint resolution. Congressional 
Globe debates from 1845 reveal that opponents of annexing Texas 
boldly anticipated this very argument. This Note explores their 
forgotten constitutional claim in the course of highlighting 
annexation’s historical pedigree as a great power. 
  Rethinking the constitutional basis for territorial expansion 
demonstrates that judges cannot apply great-powers principles 
consistently. And previously overlooked congressional annexation 
rhetoric supplies fresh diagnostic tools for identifying other great 
powers, allowing scholars to escape deceptively stale search terms. In 
fact, this Note marks the first attempt to identify a federal statute 
struck down on great-powers grounds: the Court’s decision in 
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Afroyim v. Rusk can be fairly read as holding that involuntary 
expatriation is too important a power to be inferred through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. 
INTRODUCTION 
Under traditional understandings of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Congress enjoys virtually boundless authority to choose how 
best to effectuate its enumerated powers.1 But in his 2012 National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius2 opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts recognized a core set of powers that may not be implied to 
carry out Congress’s explicit power grants. He explained that 
although Congress may exercise “incidental powers” under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause,3 that clause does not warrant “the 
exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond 
those specifically enumerated.”4 In other words, some powers are too 
important to be exercised merely through implication, even if they 
might be the most convenient means imaginable for executing 
Congress’s enumerated powers.5 These so-called “great powers” are 
off limits to Congress unless the Constitution specifically mentions 
 
 1.  See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“[I]n determining whether 
the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular 
federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related 
to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”); Evan H. Caminker, 
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2001) 
(“The question . . . is simply whether the congressional measure facilitates or assists in some 
meaningful sense the effective implementation of a primary power.”); Jennifer Mason 
McAward, McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (2012) 
(“Since the New Deal, the standard reading of McCulloch [v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 
(1819)] emphasizes Congress’s wide latitude in choosing the means by which to effectuate its 
enumerated powers and posits that the Court must accord near-complete deference to those 
choices.”). 
 2.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 3.  Id. at 2591 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421). 
 4.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411). 
 5.  See William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 
1738, 1749 (2013) (“[S]ome powers are so great, so important, or so substantive, that we should 
not assume that they were granted by implication, even if they might help effectuate an 
enumerated power.”); id. at 1752 (“If the power was important enough, it was one that the 
Constitution would be expected to grant explicitly, if at all.”); Brief of Federalism Scholars as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor at 15, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief of Federalism Scholars] (“The Necessary and Proper 
Clause . . . does not grant all conceivable implicit powers that could be useful to an enumerated 
power; it does not grant powers we would expect the Constitution to enumerate separately.”). 
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them.6 Roberts reiterated this conceptual bombshell in his United 
States v. Kebodeaux7 concurrence the very next Term.8 
Long before NFIB, Chief Justice Marshall introduced Roberts’s 
structural precept in the Supreme Court’s earliest (and greatest) 
exposition of congressional power under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause—McCulloch v. Maryland.9 The Court has never repudiated 
Marshall’s distinction between “great substantive and independent 
power[s]”10 and “incidental powers.”11 Yet because that language so 
rarely appeared in later opinions,12 the great-powers concept seemed 
to fall from the sky in 2012.13 And not in any ordinary constitutional 
case: Roberts opined that the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) 
minimum-coverage provision,14 which one scholar has called “the 
most significant change to the American social contract since the 
 
 6.  See Baude, supra note 5, at 1749 (“These powers, sometimes called ‘great powers,’ are 
the kinds of powers we would expect the Constitution to mention if they were granted.”). The 
structural concept of great powers resembles a statutory-interpretation device familiar to 
administrative lawyers: that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory 
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 7.  United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2013). 
 8.  See infra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.  
 9.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 10.  Id. at 411. 
 11.  Id. at 421. 
 12.  Only two post-McCulloch, pre-NFIB Supreme Court opinions even quote Marshall’s 
“great substantive and independent” phrase: Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 
46 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting), and Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 
(1894). 
 13.  As Professor Andrew Koppelman writes, “The distinction between a ‘great substantive 
and independent power’ and lesser powers, on the other hand, was ignored until the ACA case. 
That language is only quoted in two nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases between 
McCulloch and NFIB, both upholding congressional power.” Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,” 
“Proper,” and Health Care Reform, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 105, 109 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
Koppelman, Health Care Reform]; see also Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Everybody: 
Lawson and Kopel on Health Care Reform and Originalism, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 515, 517 
(2012) [hereinafter Koppelman, Everybody] (“For nearly 200 years, the federal government has 
taken on ever larger responsibilities without reference to these limits, which had been 
forgotten.”); Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of Article I, 123 YALE L.J. 2044, 2080 
(2014) (characterizing NFIB’s great-powers analysis as “the sudden appearance of a new 
distinction in the case law”); Michael C. Dorf, What Really Happened in the Affordable Care Act 
Case, 92 TEX. L. REV. 133, 150 (2013) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK 
CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM (2013)) (claiming that 
McCulloch’s “great substantive and independent” language “had previously been almost 
entirely ignored”). 
 14.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
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Great Society programs of the 1960s,”15 could not be sustained under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. A power to compel individuals to 
purchase health insurance or pay a penalty—the ability to create 
commerce, rather than regulate preexisting commerce—would be 
constitutionally great, incapable of being claimed inferentially.16 
Critics of the great-powers idea have underscored its dubious 
administrability: At what point, precisely, does a power become too 
important to be left to implication? Justice Ginsburg has suggested 
that judges lack the analytical tools to conclude that Congress has 
exercised an “independent” and “substantive” power, or else a 
“derivative” and “incidental” one.17 Roberts had effectively assured 
lower courts that “[y]ou will know it when you see it.”18 More 
cynically, Professor Andrew Koppelman insists that the “great 
substantive and independent power” label is simply a placeholder for 
the “interpreter’s pretheoretical intuitions about which government 
powers are particularly scary.”19 Roberts’s strange inquiry “take[s] us 
into terra incognita”20 and would unsettle much black-letter 
constitutional law.21  
 
 15.  Jack M. Balkin, The Court Affirms the Social Contract, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: 
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, supra note 13, at 11, 12. 
 16.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012). 
 17.  Id. at 2627–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Appointments Clause jurisprudence 
reinforces Ginsburg’s line-drawing concern. The Constitution explicitly distinguishes between 
“principal” and “inferior” executive officers, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2, but the Court has 
struggled to conceptualize “greatness” in this context. Compare Edmond v. United States, 520 
U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a 
superior.”), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988) (“[F]actors relating to the ‘ideas of 
tenure, duration . . . and duties’ of the independent counsel are sufficient to establish that 
appellant is an ‘inferior’ officer in the constitutional sense.” (second alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). As Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, acknowledged, “The line between 
‘inferior’ and ‘principal’ officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little 
guidance into where it should be drawn.” Id. at 671. So too with the line between great and 
incidental powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 18.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 19.  Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 118. 
 20.  Id. at 113. 
 21.  See Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of 
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 10–11 (2011) [hereinafter Koppelman, Mail 
Robbers] (“These new rules would, if consistently applied, randomly blow up large parts of the 
U.S. Code.”); Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 517 (“The[] logic [of great powers] 
implies the greatest revolution in federal power in American history. . . . Lawson and Kopel do 
not merely want to burn the house to roast the pig. They are ready to torch the whole city.”); 
Dorf, supra note 13, at 151 (“[T]o adopt th[is] . . . methodology would be to invalidate a good 
deal more than purchase mandates.”). Koppelman, writing before NFIB, was critiquing the 
claims of Gary Lawson and David Kopel, two scholars who had argued that the ACA’s 
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These are legitimate concerns. Professor William Baude began to 
grapple with them in a groundbreaking article published soon after 
NFIB.22 Baude takes the know-it-when-you-see-it objection 
seriously,23 because “we do not have anything approaching a clear test 
for deciding whether each particular unenumerated power is 
incidental or great or somewhere in between.”24 But he does believe 
that the legal community can develop an appropriately modest, 
judicially enforceable great-powers doctrine. Declining to reason 
exclusively from first principles, Baude would have judges proceed 
“inductively”—that is, heeding “specific evidence about powers that 
seem to have been thought great, either at the Founding or in post-
ratification thought and practice.”25 He hopes that “further 
 
minimum-coverage provision was not merely “incidental” to the Commerce power and was too 
important to be exercised through implication. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 22.  Baude, supra note 5. Baude intriguingly posits that Congress’s long-established power 
to condemn land in the states was originally (and widely) assumed to be too important to exist 
without enumeration. Id. at 1741. He also identifies the doctrines of commandeering, state 
sovereign immunity, military conscription, and freedom of the press as fertile ground for great-
powers scholarship. Id. at 1744; see also Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1875–76 (2012) (speculating that a power to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity might be too important to have been granted implicitly). 
 23.  See Baude, supra note 5, at 1810 n.405 (expressing his “basic sympathy with 
Koppelman and Justice Ginsburg on the vagueness point”). 
 24.  Id. at 1810; see also MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE 
ROBERTS COURT 17 (2013) (claiming that Roberts’s “opinion gets fuzzy” when it addresses the 
individual mandate’s constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause); David Kopel, 
Postscript, in A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND THE 
HEALTH CARE CASE 261, 264 (Randy E. Barnett et al. eds., 2013) (conceding that “reasonable 
people can differ about the right result” when applying great-powers principles); LaCroix, supra 
note 13, at 2080 (dismissing Roberts’s “vaguely defined” understanding of great powers); Neil S. 
Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and Statesmanship, in THE 
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, supra note 
13, at 204 (“Roberts’s language is vague and difficult to apply.”); Dorf, supra note 13, at 151 
(characterizing as “mysterious” the alleged distinction between great and incidental powers); 
Ilya Somin, Is There a Federal Eminent Domain Power?, JOTWELL (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://conlaw.jotwell.com/is-there-a-federal-eminent-domain-power (“[M]uch more needs to be 
said about how we should draw the line between incidental powers and great and independent 
ones.”). 
 25.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1810. In short, “the relative indeterminacy of the [Necessary 
and Proper] Clause and the idea of great powers it incorporated lend themselves to a historical 
inquiry focused on concrete practices.” Id. at 1808; see also Christian R. Burset, The Messy 
History of the Federal Eminent Domain Power: A Response to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 
CIRCUIT 187, 188 (2013) (“Baude’s boldly revisionist account calls us to employ the [great-
powers] concept with greater historical specificity and analytical rigor.”). Baude predicts that a 
power’s greatness will usually be too unclear to justify invalidating challenged legislation, but 
not if “subsequent practice . . . adequately liquidates its [importance].” Baude, supra note 5, at 
1812. 
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scholarship may soon catalog more fully what powers were so 
considered and why.”26 
This Note takes up Baude’s invitation. It argues that annexation 
of foreign territory is exactly the sort of power that is too important 
to be left to implication through the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
The Constitution enumerates no congressional territorial-acquisition 
power, yet the United States has twice—and only twice—acquired 
foreign land statutorily27: the annexations of Texas (in 1845)28 and 
Hawaii (in 1898).29 Each time, annexationists introduced a joint 
resolution only after failing to secure enough votes to ratify a duly 
negotiated treaty.30 Perhaps uniform reliance on the treaty process 
before and between these famous outliers amounts to the kind of 
“clear historical practice”31 Baude would require for judicial 
invalidation on great-powers grounds. Perhaps congressional 
constitutional objections to Texas’s annexation,32 relying critically on 
the notion of great powers, are the sort of “post-ratification 
thought”33 that can enhance annexation’s historical pedigree as a 
great power. But in any case, the example of annexation confirms that 
scholars should not despair of achieving consensus while reasoning 
deductively about great powers. Considered entirely in the abstract, 
territorial acquisition—like levying taxes or declaring war34—is 
 
 26.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1811. 
 27.  See Douglas W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation 
To Extend the Territorial Sea, 1 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 1, 19 (1990) (identifying the annexations of 
Texas and Hawaii as the “two instances in which the United States acquired territory by 
legislative action”). Kmiec’s article was originally written as a formal Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion. Id. at 1. 
 28.  Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th 
Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845). 
 29.  Joint Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 
J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898). 
 30.  See infra notes 149, 226 and accompanying text. 
 31.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1818. As the Court recently concluded in the context of recess 
appointments, “when considered against 200 years of settled practice, we regard [a] few 
scattered examples as anomalies.” Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 
2567 (2014). 
 32.  For an overview of these unheeded objections, see infra Part II.A. 
 33.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1810. 
 34.  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (classifying these 
enumerated powers, among others, as “great powers”). Marshall presumably meant that these 
powers could not have been exercised through implication had they not been enumerated. I 
take no position on whether every enumerated congressional power is properly regarded as a 
great power because of its enumeration. See also Baude, supra note 5, at 1754–55 (“This is not 
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precisely the sort of power that seems too great and substantive to be 
used as a means of fulfilling express power grants.35 
Part I of this Note traces the Necessary and Proper Clause’s 
relationship with the idea of great versus incidental powers. It builds 
on other scholars’ work to connect the Clause’s original meaning, 
early debates on the constitutionality of the proposed Bank of the 
United States, Chief Justice Marshall’s McCulloch opinion, and Chief 
Justice Roberts’s surprising resurrection of the great-powers concept 
in NFIB and Kebodeaux. 
Part II makes an affirmative case for territorial annexation as a 
“great substantive and independent power.” It features forgotten 
congressional great-powers rhetoric that demonstrates how the 
concept “can be useful in nonjudicial constitutional interpretation,”36 
even if judges might disagree on borderline applications. 
Congressional opponents of annexing Texas generated the most 
striking evidence I have found of a legislative body’s reasoning about 
the idea of great powers. Fifty-three years later, opponents of 
annexing Hawaii chose to distinguish (rather than dispute) the 
precedent of annexing Texas and immediately admitting it to 
statehood.37 They thereby deprived themselves of the ability to 
characterize annexation as a great power, since the Constitution 
apparently did permit statutory annexation under certain 
circumstances. But their crusade against “powers inherent in 
sovereignty”38 furnished constitutional scholars with a useful 
diagnostic tool: when a congressional power can be defended only on 
such flimsy extraconstitutional grounds, it is an especially fine 
candidate for great-power status. 
Part III considers two consequences of the argument presented 
in Part II. First, if territorial annexation is too important to be 
inferred from some other power, the great-powers doctrine simply 
 
to say that every explicitly enumerated power is a great one that could not otherwise be implied 
. . . .”).  
 35.  My argument extends to all statutory annexations, regardless of the acquired 
territory’s square mileage. Declaring war does not cease to be a great power if the belligerents 
clash once and call it quits; levying taxes is constitutionally “great” even if Congress exacts 
trifling sums. Likewise, this Note argues, all forms of legislative annexation necessarily exceed 
congressional competencies. 
 36.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1810. 
 37.  See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 38.  I borrow this term from Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, passim (2002). 
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cannot be applied consistently. Much as some judicial originalists 
avowedly make “pragmatic exception[s]”39 to their methodology for 
entrenched constitutional settlements achieved outside Article V, no 
judge will ever use Texas’s or Hawaii’s unconstitutionality as a 
premise in constitutional decisionmaking. So judges who deploy 
Roberts’s (and Marshall’s) doctrine of great versus incidental powers 
must be prepared to explain why they should sometimes decline to 
follow their best understanding of the Constitution. 
Second, congressional debates about territorial annexation 
demonstrate that constitutional actors are capable of reflecting on 
great powers without using Marshall’s familiar “great substantive and 
independent” phraseology. Scholars should therefore parse Supreme 
Court opinions more carefully before asserting that the great-powers 
idea simply disappeared from constitutional adjudication (if not 
constitutional discourse) for nearly two hundred years.40 Indeed, this 
Note marks the first attempt to identify a federal statute struck down 
on great-powers grounds: Afroyim v. Rusk41 can be fairly read as 
holding that involuntary expatriation is too important a power to be 
inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause.42 
I.  OF BANKS AND MANDATES 
The great-powers principle enjoys a rich intellectual heritage, 
and Chief Justice Roberts has begun to restore its place in 
constitutional law. This Part examines early understandings of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Marshall’s pathbreaking 
implementation of great powers in McCulloch, and the Roberts 
Court’s growing fascination with the idea as a leading principle of 
structural constitutional law. 
A. The Intellectual Origins of Great Powers 
A group of historically minded scholars has persuasively argued 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause—which was drafted by five 
 
 39.  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 140 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). 
 40.  See John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 59 n.349 (2014) (“[I]n no case has the Court ever invalidated an act of Congress on the 
ground that it employed a ‘great substantive and independent power,’ in contravention of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.”). 
 41.  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
 42.  See infra notes 308–21 and accompanying text. 
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legally skilled public servants who “th[ought] of government 
responsibilities in terms of agency and other fiduciary 
relationships”43—embodied the agency-law doctrine of principal and 
incidental powers.44 An incidental power “had to be less important or 
less valuable than its [enumerated] principal,” and also “subordinate 
to or dependent on the principal.”45 Thus, an implied power cannot be 
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”46 an enumerated 
power if it is more important or far-reaching than the explicitly 
granted one. Only if an implied power is inferior (that is, incidental) 
to its principal may an interpreter then ask whether it is sufficiently 
adapted to effectuate the principal.47 
Even Koppelman, the most outspoken critic of the great-powers 
doctrine, seems to concede that the best understanding of the 
Constitution—from both a historical and theoretical standpoint—is 
that it requires some greater-and-lesser relationship between express 
and implied powers.48 He disputes only that principle’s contemporary 
administrability and the wisdom of adhering to it after an apparently 
 
 43.  Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 84, 86 (2010).  
 44.  See Baude, supra note 5, at 1750–51 (“[B]oth before and after ratification, 
commentators repeatedly described the Necessary and Proper Clause as confirming established 
principles of implicit or incidental powers. . . . Lawyers would thus have understood the words 
‘necessary and proper’ to invoke the ‘incidental powers’ doctrine that had developed under 
existing principles of law.”). 
 45.  Natelson, supra note 43, at 52, 61. 
 46.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 47.  Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental 
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267, 273 (2011). 
 48.  See Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 516 (“The book is a valuable 
contribution, an original and enlightening exploration of the contemporaneous meaning of the 
Clause.”); Koppelman, Mail Robbers, supra note 21, at 116 (granting that Lawson and Kopel’s 
research “sure looks impressive”); see also John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1122 (2011) (reviewing LAWSON ET AL., 
supra note 43) (concluding that “the authors make a strong case” that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause authorizes only certain incidental powers); John F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper 
Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2012) (reviewing LAWSON ET AL., 
supra note 43) (“I have no problem concluding that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an 
incidental powers clause.”). A decade earlier, Professor Caleb Nelson argued that “Marshall’s 
concept of ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ reflects a sensible canon of 
interpretation. . . . [Otherwise,] relatively small tails [could] wag some very big dogs.” Caleb 
Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 
1640 (2002) (first alteration in original). 
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extended judicial dormancy.49 After all, the great-powers framework 
explains why certain enumerations are not superfluous.50 And given 
that Congress may also legislate to effectuate its implied powers—
even ones three steps removed from an associated enumerated 
power51—surely some structural limitation must exist to ensure that 
doubly and triply derivative powers do not overshadow the 
enumerated objects they obliquely serve.52 
In 1791, great-powers thinking underwent a lasting shift. The 
First Congress debated whether to charter a Bank of the United 
States as a corporation; once the bill passed, President Washington 
solicited his cabinet’s formal legal advice on whether to sign it.53 
Because no enumerated power authorized Congress to create 
financial instrumentalities,54 a national bank would have been 
constitutional only if inferable through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. As these early explications revealed, the nation’s leading legal 
thinkers understood that clause to distinguish between principal 
(greater) and incidental (lesser) powers.55 And beyond merely 
 
 49.  See Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 518 (“[I]t is not obvious how to translate 
these terms from their then-familiar applications in property law or the law of corporations to 
the very different context of governmental powers.”). 
 50.  Congress’s powers to call out the militia and raise armies reinforce the power to 
declare war, but each was explicitly mentioned in Article I. Baude, supra note 5, at 1752. 
Likewise, “If Congress has all powers, great and small, that are helpful to carrying out its other 
powers, then surely it would implicitly have a general power to tax already.” Id. at 1754. 
 51.  See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 147 (2010) (“[E]ven the dissent 
acknowledges that Congress has the implied power to criminalize any conduct that might 
interfere with the exercise of an enumerated power, and also the additional power to imprison 
people who violate those (inferentially authorized) laws, and the additional power to provide 
for the safe and reasonable management of those prisons, and the additional power to regulate 
the prisoners’ behavior even after their release.” (emphases added)); id. at 148 (“[W]e must 
reject [the] argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits no more than a single step 
between an enumerated power and an Act of Congress.”). 
 52.  See James Madison, Speech on Feb. 2, 1791, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL 
BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 39, 42 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., 1832) [hereinafter 
HISTORY OF THE BANK] (arguing that “Necessary and Proper” cannot mean merely 
“conducive,” because “[i]f implications, thus remote, and thus multiplied, can be linked 
together, a chain may be formed, that will reach every object . . . within the whole compass of 
political economy”). 
 53.  H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 914 (1985).  
 54.  See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION 
TO THE CIVIL WAR 103 (1957) (“There is nothing in the Constitution about banks and banking 
. . . .”). 
 55.  See Baude, supra note 5, at 1751–54 (recounting this constitutional debate through the 
lens of principal and incidental powers). 
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claiming that implied powers may not eclipse the enumerated powers 
they help execute, these actors also assumed that some powers are too 
important to have been granted by implication. 
Representative James Madison, for example, argued that “the 
degree of [a power’s] importance” determines “the probability or 
improbability of its being left to construction.”56 Similarly, Attorney 
General Edmund Randolph informed President Washington that 
congressional powers “are either incidental, or substantive, that is, 
independent powers.”57 Most conceivable powers need not be 
expressly delegated, he reasoned, but “substantive and independent” 
powers “would not otherwise have existed” had they not been 
enumerated.58 Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton also 
endorsed this principle, arguing that “[t]he power to erect 
corporations, is not to be considered as an independent and 
substantive power, but as an incidental and auxiliary one; and was, 
therefore, more properly left to implication, than expressly granted.”59 
In sum, Madison, Randolph, and Hamilton—the last of whom 
even believed the Bank bill to be constitutional60—all agreed that an 
implied power’s perceived importance affects a federal statute’s 
constitutionality under the Necessary and Proper Clause.61 These 
Founding-era bank debates, then, powerfully illustrate the great-
powers concept’s impressive intellectual ancestry. They also seem to 
have permanently reconfigured great-powers thinking—instead of 
asking whether an implied power reached more broadly than its 
enumerated parent, the relevant inquiry became whether a power was 
so important that it could not be exercised without itself being 
enumerated. 
 
 56.  Madison, supra note 52, at 40. Madison also insisted that the constitutional structure 
“condemn[s] the exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not 
evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.” Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
 57.  Memorandum from Edmund Randolph, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to George 
Washington, President of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra 
note 52, at 89, 90. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Memorandum from Alexander Hamilton, Sec’y of the Treasury of the U.S., to George 
Washington, President of the U.S. (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra 
note 52, at 95, 105. 
 60.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1752. 
 61.  See William Baude, Sharing the Necessary and Proper Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 
39, 42–43 (2014) (concluding that these “bank debates . . . t[ook] as common ground that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause extended only to incidental powers, and not potentially great 
ones”). 
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B. Great Powers in the Marshall Court 
In McCulloch, which sustained the constitutionality of the 
Second Bank of the United States,62 these legal giants’ intuitions 
about principal versus incidental powers acquired the force of 
constitutional law. Chief Justice Marshall explained that some powers 
are too important to have been granted to Congress by implication 
alone. He styled these “great powers,”63 “great outlines,”64 “great 
objects,”65 “vast powers,”66 powers “less usual, . . . of higher 
dignity, . . . more requiring a particular specification,”67 powers 
“distinct and independent,”68 and “great substantive and independent 
power[s].”69 
The Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that Congress also 
possesses an unspecifiable number of lesser powers to carry its 
enumerated grants into execution. These lesser powers are 
“incidental,”70 “subdivisions,”71 “minor ingredients which compose 
[larger] objects,”72 and “powers . . . of inferior importance.”73 For 
Marshall, creating a corporation could “pass as incidental to those 
powers which are expressly given,”74 as several other powers could 
not.75 In any event, McCulloch can be fairly cited for the proposition 
that some powers are sufficiently important that they “cannot be 
 
 62.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 424 (1819). 
 63.  Id. at 407, 421. 
 64.  Id. at 407. 
 65.  Id. at 418. 
 66.  Id. at 408. 
 67.  Id. at 421; see id. (intimating that there is “reason to suppose that a constitution . . . 
ought to have specified” some powers); id. at 422 (suggesting that constitutional drafters feel a 
“motive for particularly mentioning” some powers). 
 68.  Id. at 421. 
 69.  Id. at 411. 
 70.  Id. at 406. 
 71.  Id. at 407. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 408. 
 74.  Id. at 411. 
 75.  Marshall provided several data points. See id. at 407 (characterizing as “great” the 
powers “to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and 
conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies”); id. at 411 (classifying “the power[s] 
of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce” as “great substantive and 
independent power[s]”). 
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implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing 
them.”76  
If Marshall had advanced this dichotomy to invalidate a 
congressional statute, as Chief Justice Roberts seems willing to do, 
constitutional scholars would surely have committed his several 
phrases to heart. But the logic of great powers hasn’t atrophied since 
McCulloch, even if efforts to operationalize it are “strange-sounding 
to modern ears.”77 Nearly two centuries later, Marshall’s distant 
successor has championed the great-powers idea anew. 
C. Great Powers in the Roberts Court 
Chief Justice Roberts explicitly revived this “old, established line 
of thinking”78 in his 2012 NFIB opinion. The ACA’s minimum-
coverage provision was not warranted under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, he reasoned, because it bore the marks of a “great 
substantive and independent power.”79 The individual mandate was 
not a proper means of executing the Commerce power, because 
requiring people to obtain adequate health insurance or pay a penalty 
“vest[ed] Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the 
necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power.”80 It 
would “work a substantial expansion of federal authority” for 
Congress to “draw within its regulatory scope those [people] who 
would otherwise be outside of it,” so that it could then regulate them 
in a manner authorized by Article I, Section 8.81 
This is an odd way of revitalizing an elementary structural 
principle—predicate-creation seems to have nothing to do with 
comparative assessments of importance and inferiority, or with 
abstract notions of greatness.82 Nor did Roberts assist readers by 
 
 76.  Id. at 411; see also Baude, supra note 5, at 1753 (concluding that McCulloch endorsed 
the idea that lesser powers are more properly left to implication). Not even Professor John 
Manning, who opposes robust judicial enforcement of necessary-and-proper limitations, denies 
that McCulloch created such a “test”; he claims only that it “was not central to McCulloch’s 
analysis.” Manning, supra note 40, at 59 n.349. 
 77.  Lawson & Kopel, supra note 47, at 270. 
 78.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1749; see Burset, supra note 25, at 188 (observing that “the 
notion of ‘great powers’ is well established”). 
 79.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (quoting 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411). 
 80.  Id. at 2592. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Koppelman claims that “here [Roberts] is no longer relying on the ‘great substantive 
and independent power’ idea.” Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 114. If 
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“explain[ing] the provenance or implications of that statement.”83 But 
he did claim that manufacturing the means for exercising an 
enumerated power can never truly qualify as incidental.84 And the 
mandate’s perceived greatness surely accounted for the “substantial 
expansion of federal authority”85 he predicted. Congress had 
attempted to aggrandize its authority relative to its proper 
“regulatory scope”86—that is, powers specifically enumerated and 
implied powers that are not themselves “great substantive and 
independent power[s].”87 If Roberts indeed adapted his great-powers 
argument from Professor Gary Lawson and David Kopel’s 
scholarship,88 he very likely understood the theoretical underpinnings 
of Marshall’s great-powers phraseology, because those scholars 
explicitly argued that a power to issue economic mandates was not 
incidental to the related Commerce power89 and was too important to 
be left to implication.90 
Roberts resorted to more orthodox great-powers reasoning in his 
2013 Kebodeaux concurrence, propelling his intellectual stewardship 
of the idea. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that Congress 
could, under the Military Regulation and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, require a former military serviceman to register as a sex 
offender well after his release from federal custody.91 Roberts 
 
Koppelman is right, it is unclear whether Roberts ever relies on great-powers principles in his 
NFIB opinion. I doubt that Roberts would have emphasized predicate-creation had he not felt 
compelled to distinguish NFIB from three recent power-sustaining Necessary and Proper 
Clause decisions: United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 
600 (2004); and Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003). See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 
(summarizing and distinguishing these cases). 
 83.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1749. 
 84.  NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 2593 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)).  
 88.  See Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 112 (“The distinction . . . is 
drawn, without acknowledgment, from an attack on the mandate developed by Gary Lawson 
and David Kopel.”); id. at 117 (“Roberts didn’t give the credit that Lawson and Kopel 
deserved.”); Dorf, supra note 13, at 150 (“[T]his claim draws on an argument developed at some 
length by Gary Lawson and David Kopel.”).  
 89.  Lawson & Kopel, supra note 47, at 279–80 (“[T]he power to compel the purchase of a 
product from another private party is not a ‘less worthy’ or less substantial power than the 
power to regulate commerce . . . .”). 
 90.  Id. at 280 (“It is an extraordinary power of independent significance, or ‘high[] dignity,’ 
that would be enumerated as a principal power if it were granted at all to the federal 
government.” (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421)). 
 91.  United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2505 (2013). 
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concurred only in the Military Regulation Clause holding; he wrote 
separately to clarify that the majority opinion should not be 
interpreted as relying on a federal police power.92 For he could 
imagine no clearer example of a “great substantive and independent 
power”93 than what the majority seemed willing to countenance: an 
ill-defined license to “help protect the public . . . and alleviate public 
safety concerns.”94 When a power is of “that magnitude,” Roberts 
“find[s] it implausible to suppose—and impossible to support—that 
the Framers intended to confer such authority by implication rather 
than expression.”95 Because the majority’s military-regulation 
rationale upheld a power “less substantial” than a pure federal police 
power, the challenged registration requirement was “not such a ‘great 
substantive and independent power’ that the Framers’ failure to 
enumerate it must imply its absence.”96 Perhaps Baude’s elegant 
article prompted Roberts to clarify his theoretical basis for quoting 
McCulloch.97 In any event, the Chief Justice’s Kebodeaux concurrence 
crisply depicts the notion of great powers, improving on NFIB’s more 
enigmatic invocation. 
None of Roberts’s colleagues joined these NFIB and Kebodeaux 
passages, but his message has begun to resonate. Writing separately in 
the highly anticipated 2014 case of Bond v. United States,98 Justice 
Scalia argued that a congressional power to implement non-self-
executing treaties99 without observing structural constitutional 
limitations would qualify as a “great substantive and independent 
power.”100 With the right enabling treaty, such legislative discretion 
would constitute a “general police power”101 and enable Congress to 
abrogate the Court’s constitutional decisions.102 Although it would 
 
 92.  Id. at 2507 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. (quoting id. at 2503 (majority opinion)). 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. at 2508. 
 97.  Baude clerked for Chief Justice Roberts, after all. John G. Roberts, Jr., OYEZ, 
http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). 
 98.  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 99.  As the Supreme Court has explained, a non-self-executing treaty “does not by itself 
give rise to domestically enforceable federal law” without “implementing legislation passed by 
Congress.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008). 
 100.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2101 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819)). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 2100. 
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seem illogical for Article I to enumerate the power to allow the 
“principle of limited federal powers to be set aside,”103 Scalia should 
be considered as firmly within the great-powers camp, because he 
favorably cited Baude’s seminal distillation of the idea of great 
powers.104 As should Justice Thomas, who signed on to Scalia’s Bond 
concurrence in full.105 Litigators have also taken the hint: Paul 
Clement’s brief for Carol Anne Bond itself characterized an 
unfettered congressional ability to effectuate non-self-executing 
treaties as a prohibited great power.106 
Roberts’s renascent doctrine is hitting its jurisprudential stride. 
Because three Justices have openly endorsed the idea,107 great-powers 
limitations may soon begin to command majority holdings, and even 
serve as the basis for striking down historic federal legislation. It is 
largely unclear where this undertheorized principle might lead.108 
Newfound interest in the Necessary and Proper Clause109 portends 
“important and potentially far-reaching consequences that have not 
been fully appreciated—even by the Court itself.”110 Now is the 
 
 103.  Id. at 2102. Scalia’s application is therefore conceptually problematic, because he 
presumably means that an unreviewable power to implement non-self-executing treaties is too 
important to be exercised through implication rather than enumeration. 
 104.  Scalia specifically cited Baude’s seven-page synopsis of the great-powers concept, not 
just his article generally. Id. at 2101. And it is fair to assume that the Justice who insisted that 
Congress “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes,” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 
U.S. 457, 468 (2001), believes that Article I does not, either. 
 105.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 106.  See Brief for Petitioner at 61, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) (No. 12-
158) (“[T]he last place such plenary power lies inchoate . . . is the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
An unchecked power to implement treaties would amount to exactly the sort of ‘great 
substantive and independent power’ that the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot supply.” 
(citations omitted)). Similarly, in a 2013 amicus brief disputing the constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, a group of federalism scholars argued that a congressional power to 
define marital status is “exactly the type of power we would expect the Constitution to 
enumerate.” Brief of Federalism Scholars, supra note 5, at 16.  
 107.  Manning, supra note 40, at 59 (“Several members of the Roberts Court, though not the 
Court itself, have now endorsed the ‘great powers’ approach as one metric for determining what 
is ‘necessary and proper.’”).  
 108.  See Baude, supra note 61, at 48 (“We just don’t know yet how much that inquiry will 
yield, and what the answers will be. Much of the post-Founding discussion . . . will probably be 
found in congressional and executive materials, not case law, and nobody has yet systematically 
perused those materials with the relevant ‘revisionist’ lens.” (footnote omitted)). 
 109.  See LaCroix, supra note 13, at 2060 (“In recent years . . . the Court has increasingly 
brought the necessary and proper power to the center of federalism doctrine.”). 
 110.  Id. at 2049; see id. at 2060 (“Because the power is relatively undertheorized, it provides 
new avenues for doctrinal development, sometimes in surprising directions.”). 
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time—not in the crucible of litigation—for scholars to survey the 
great-powers concept’s sphere of operation. 
II.  TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION: A TEXTBOOK GREAT POWER 
“It is worth asking,” of course, “whether and in what fashion the 
Constitution permits the United States to expand its territory.”111 
Consistent application of the great-powers doctrine suggests a 
shocking consequence: Texas and Hawaii were very likely acquired 
unconstitutionally, their legislative annexations “merely acts of 
usurpation.”112 Both land masses were annexed to the United States 
through ordinary lawmaking in the form of a joint resolution.113 I start 
with the assumption, required by the Tenth Amendment, that “every 
exercise of [congressional] power must be traceable to an explicit or 
implicit grant of power in the document.”114 There is no enumerated 
territorial-annexation power in Article I, Section 8 or anywhere else 
in the Constitution.115 Congress’s power to acquire foreign territory 
must be inferred as incidental to a granted power, or it does not 
exist.116 
Article IV, Section 3’s Admissions Clause provides that “[n]ew 
States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.”117 With 
 
 111.  GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 21 (2004); see John Gorham Palfrey, The 
Growth of the Idea of Annexation, and Its Breaking upon Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L. REV. 
371, 394 (1899) (“Whether the [C]onstitution is violated or not is a serious question.”). 
 112.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (quoting 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997)). 
 113.  See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
799, 835 (1995) (characterizing both annexation resolutions as “ordinary domestic legislation”). 
For the joint resolutions themselves, see generally Joint Resolution for the Admission of the 
State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845), and Joint Resolution To 
Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 
750 (1898). 
 114.  LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 22; see Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 
(1967) (“[O]ur Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those 
that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones.”). Article I, after all, 
vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis 
added). 
 115.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1845) (statement of Rep. Dromgoole); id. 
app. at 84 (statement of Rep. Brengle); 31 CONG. REC. 6334 (1898) (statement of Sen. Foraker); 
LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 21.  
 116.  See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1845) (statement of Rep. Kennedy) (“If, 
therefore, there was a power to acquire territory at all, conveyed in that instrument, all must 
admit it to be a power of implication alone.”). 
 117.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
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respect to Texas, this clause was the only textual “great outline” to 
which an implied annexation power might have fairly answered.118 But 
regardless of means–ends fit, acquiring sovereign territory is exactly 
the kind of power that seems so important, so consequential, that it 
would have been enumerated if Congress were meant to possess it. 
And the relevant incident–principal relationship—using an implied 
power (annexation) to create the necessary predicate for the exercise 
of an enumerated power (admission of new states)—eerily resembles 
the arrangement Roberts condemned in NFIB.119 
The typical constitutional defense of Congress’s annexation of 
Texas goes something like this: Article IV empowers Congress to 
admit new states to the Union. “It does not say precisely how this 
must be accomplished. Congress chose to admit Texas as a new state, 
by joint resolution. End of debate.”120 But several structural and 
functionalist considerations,121 along with pre-1845 governmental 
practice,122 suggest that Congress may admit new states only from 
territory that existed when the Constitution was ratified or that might 
be acquired through treaty. Moreover, the above defense highlights 
Hawaii’s even shakier constitutional status, because sixty-one years 
elapsed between its annexation and admission to the Union.123 
Regarding Hawaii, it is irrelevant for great-powers purposes whether 
the language of the Admissions Clause actually authorizes Congress 
to admit foreign territory directly to statehood, because Congress 
 
 118.  See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead) 
(“[O]f all the articles in the [C]onstitution, and of all the enumerated powers of that instrument, 
it is only upon the [Admissions Clause], that reliance is placed for the authority of Congress to 
annex a foreign territory to this Union.”). As Ralph Brock has noted, when Congress annexed 
Texas through joint resolution, it purported to “act[] under [its] power to admit new states.” 
Ralph H. Brock, “The Republic of Texas Is No More”: An Answer to the Claim That Texas Was 
Unconstitutionally Annexed to the United States, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 679, 728 (1997).  
 119.  See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.  
 120.  James W. Paulsen, If at First You Don’t Secede: Ten Reasons Why the “Republic of 
Texas” Movement Is Wrong, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 801, 803 (1997); see also LAWSON & SEIDMAN, 
supra note 111, at 93 (“If Congress passed (and the President signed) ordinary legislation 
authorizing the annexation of territory, that legislation would be fully effective as a matter of 
domestic law. . . . [T]he legislation could be enacted pursuant to the Admissions Clause if the 
territory was immediately entering statehood.”).  
 121.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 122.  See infra notes 144–49, 198–206 and accompanying text. 
 123.  See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. Lawson and Seidman see no 
constitutional problem here, either: they argue that Congress may acquire foreign territory 
“pursuant to the [Necessary and Proper] Clause if [the acquired land] was to be held as a 
territory for some time (or if, for some reason, acquisition must temporally precede 
admission).” LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 93. 
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chose not to confer statehood on Hawaii immediately.124 Hawaii thus 
presents the perfect test case for territorial annexation as a “great 
substantive and independent power.” 
This jarring application of the great-powers concept is not 
entirely original. Constitutional opponents of annexing Texas 
repeatedly anticipated this Part’s exact argument,125 though no one 
seems to have consciously invoked Marshall’s magic phrases. In both 
1845 and 1898, congressmen assembled a strong textual and structural 
case for the unconstitutionality of annexation through joint 
resolution. Even if constitutional objections ultimately subserved 
antislavery and anti-imperialist motives,126 these congressmen 
exhibited an impressive devotion to the limiting logic of a government 
of enumerated powers.127 This Part explores their arguments against 
the backdrop of the reinvigorated great-powers doctrine. Consistent 
application of this doctrine should lead its proponents to conclude 
that Texas and Hawaii were unconstitutionally annexed to the United 
States. 
In 1898, though, virtually all congressional opponents of 
annexing Hawaii implicitly conceded that Texas withstood 
constitutional rigor, because it had been annexed (and admitted) 
pursuant to the literal words of the Admissions Clause.128 Hawaii 
would not elect senators and congressmen immediately,129 so no 
 
 124.  See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 125.  To my knowledge, this Note is the first effort to canvass Texas’s annexation through 
the lens of great powers. So I disagree that Professor Earl Maltz’s excellent article provides a 
“complete analysis of the constitutional aspects of the struggle over Texas.” Earl M. Maltz, The 
Constitution and the Annexation of Texas, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 381, 381 (2006).  
 126.  But see Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, The Louisiana 
Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803-
1898, at 83, 88 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2005) (denying that “objections 
to [Texas’s] annexation overtly based on opposition to the joint resolution and expansionism 
were smokescreens for the objections based on opposition to slavery”). 
 127.  Their exertions thus powerfully demonstrate how the great-powers concept “can be 
useful in nonjudicial constitutional interpretation,” since “Congress and the President . . . are 
supposed to decide whether the laws they pass and implement are constitutionally permissible.” 
Baude, supra note 5, at 1810. 
 128.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d. Sess. 246 (1845) (statement of Sen. Walker) 
(“[T]hat clause of the [C]onstitution, which authorizes Congress to admit new States into the 
Union . . . was in express words, and no man has a right to interpolate restrictions.”); id. at 321 
(statement of Sen. Merrick) (“‘New States may be admitted by the Congress into the Union.’ 
How plain! [H]ow explicit! [H]ow comprehensive! Language could not be plainer; and words 
could not show more directly and more certainly our authority and power to pass the joint 
resolution now on the table, than these words.”). 
 129.  Hawaii did not become a state until 1959. See infra note 229. 
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institutional precedent could squarely legitimate its annexation. But 
by conceding Texas’s constitutionality to facilitate distinction-
drawing, opponents surrendered the even clearer great-powers 
objection to acquiring foreign territory not immediately intended for 
statehood. After all, the Constitution apparently permitted one 
species of legislative annexation, and surely the power to acquire new 
possessions and convert them to statehood included the power merely 
to acquire those possessions. Accordingly, great-powers rhetoric 
appeared nowhere in the congressional campaign to defeat Hawaii’s 
annexation,130 where it could have operated even more forcefully than 
in 1845. 
The annexation of Hawaii therefore represents a regrettable 
missed opportunity for a robust congressional debate about what 
“great substantive and independent power[s]” are and how to reason 
about them responsibly. But the terms on which this debate was 
conducted nonetheless suggest a useful heuristic for identifying great 
powers: if a power can be (or historically has been) justified only as 
an incident of national sovereignty, it is an especially worthy 
contender for great-power status. 
Four objections are worth answering before examining the Texas 
and Hawaii annexations in Parts II.A and II.B. First, “it is wrong to 
view the admission of Texas as if it involved a congressional-executive 
agreement,” and “[t]he same is true of Hawaii.”131 Congress acted 
unilaterally in both cases; its “ordinary domestic legislation” did not 
simply ratify executive agreements negotiated with foreign powers.132 
So I disagree with Vasan Kesavan and Professor Michael Stokes 
Paulsen that Texas’s annexation represents “the first ‘congressional-
executive agreement’ in the history of the United States.”133 
Second, a congressional territorial-annexation power cannot be 
inferred from the enumerated power “[t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United 
 
 130.  Congressmen debated the issue throughout June 1898. See 31 CONG. REC. 5770–6712 
(1898) (analyzing the political and constitutional issues related to Hawaii’s annexation). 
 131.  Ackerman & Golove, supra note 113, at 835. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess with Texas, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1587, 1593 (2004). Nor was either statutory annexation essentially a “treaty ratified by joint 
resolution.” Eric Steven O’Malley, Note, Irreconcilable Rights and the Question of Hawaiian 
Statehood, 89 GEO. L.J. 501, 512 (2001). 
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States.”134 Article II empowers the president to “make Treaties” with 
foreign governments, subject to Senate ratification.135 But a 
congressional power to annex foreign territory in no way effectuates 
the president’s power to conclude treaties annexing foreign 
territory—it supplants it. Annexing foreign territory no more 
implements the power to annex foreign territory than granting letters 
of marque effectuates the power to grant letters of marque.136 
Third, Professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove object that 
the treaty process was ill-suited to acquire the Republics of Texas and 
Hawaii. After all, “what would have been the point of a treaty with a 
country that was immediately going out of existence when the 
agreement was executed? . . . Any promises made in a treaty would 
have immediately lost their international character.”137 But 
annexation clauses do not make promises—they transfer land. 
Cession treaties need not stipulate any ongoing obligations between 
sovereign nations. And regardless, the specter of international-law 
anomalies cannot create congressional authority within a framework 
of limited and enumerated powers.138 If the Constitution does not 
authorize congressional acquisition of foreign territory, any oddity in 
allowing entire countries to be acquired through treaty cannot rectify 
statutory annexation’s constitutional defects. 
Fourth, and similarly, Congress cannot bootstrap its way into 
possessing a territorial-annexation power merely because the treaty 
form seems poorly adapted to acquiring certain lands. Consider the 
case of truly unoccupied territory, or of territory so sparsely inhabited 
 
 134.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
 135.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 136.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress to “grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal”). 
 137.  Ackerman & Golove, supra note 113, at 835; see also LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 
111, at 109 (“A treaty could secure the consent of the foreign sovereign to annexation, but as 
soon as the annexation is complete, the treaty no longer exists because one of the parties to the 
treaty no longer exists.”). 
 138.  As Lawson and Seidman themselves insist, “The United States government is defined 
by the federal Constitution, not by the law of nations.” LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 
100; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“If no 
enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted 
. . . .”); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“Our Constitution governs us and we must 
never forget that our Constitution limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or 
those that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted ones.”); Fleming v. 
Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 618 (1850) (“Our own Constitution and form of government must 
be our only guide.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration [of 
certain congressional powers] presupposes something not enumerated.”). 
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as to enjoy no centralized control and therefore no obvious authority 
to cede land.139 No negotiating counterparty would exist in such 
situations. Yet the Supreme Court accounted for them in 1890, when 
it recognized an organic mode of acquiring territorial sovereignty: 
“dominion of new territory may be acquired by discovery and 
occupation . . . of territory unoccupied by any other government or its 
citizens.”140 Whatever the merits of this position,141 the more 
fundamental point is that Congress may never legislate over an area 
simply because denying it such power would be inconvenient.142 
A. Texas 
Despite President Jefferson’s constitutional misgivings,143 the 
United States annexed the Louisiana Territory by treaty in 1803.144 It 
acquired Spanish Florida through the same means in 1819.145 By 1828, 
Chief Justice Marshall could declare that the “government possesses 
the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.”146 
So when the Tyler administration set its sights on Texas, it was black-
letter law that the United States could constitutionally acquire foreign 
 
 139.  I thank Bill O’Connell for pressing this point. 
 140.  Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).  
 141.  Lawson and Seidman argue that Jones was “singularly unpersuasive” on this score 
because it justified discovery-based acquisition through “general understandings about 
governmental power drawn from the law of nations,” apparently without reference to domestic 
constitutional limitations. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 100. Those same limitations 
also undermine Lawson and Seidman’s defense of a congressional annexation power. See infra 
notes 328–34 and accompanying text. 
 142.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 143.  See EVERETT SOMERVILLE BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812, at 23 (1920) (describing Jefferson’s perceived “need of a 
constitutional amendment to authorize the acquisition” of foreign territory). Jefferson 
presumably would have been doubly opposed to statutory annexation because of the additional 
burden of justifying congressional power. 
 144.  Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.  
 145.  Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and 
His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.  
 146.  Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828). If territorial annexation is 
indeed a great power, any assumed national power to acquire enemy territory through military 
conquest should not be understood as a latent congressional power incidental to its enumerated 
power to declare war. For if annexation is too important to be inferred, this holds true 
regardless of which enumerated power it might effectuate. The propriety of acquiring territory 
through military conquest is therefore governed not directly by domestic constitutional law, but 
by jus in bello—the body of international law marking the limits of acceptable belligerent 
behavior. 
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territory through treaty.147 American and Texian148 diplomats signed 
such a treaty in April 1844, but the Senate rejected it by the 
overwhelming margin of 35–16.149  
Annexationists soon resorted to the more numerically permissive 
device of ordinary lawmaking in the form of a joint resolution. This 
proposal was unprecedented, since the United States had never 
acquired foreign territory legislatively.150 As Chief Justice Roberts 
later observed in NFIB, “sometimes ‘the most telling indication of [a] 
severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent’ 
for Congress’s action.”151 Opponents of annexation certainly 
“pause[d] to consider the implications”152 of a never-before-asserted 
congressional power. Congressman Samuel Sample, for one, labeled 
this opportunistic circumvention of the customary treaty process “a 
hop, skip, and jump over the [C]onstitution.”153 The Supreme Court’s 
 
 147.  It appears that not a single congressman disputed this proposition during the debates 
over annexing Texas. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1845) (statement of 
Rep. Dromgoole) (“[H]e did not question the power of this government to be exercised by the 
President, in the form of a treaty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to acquire 
territory.”); id. at 187 (statement of Rep. Barnard) (“[H]e admitted—and this was the important 
point in his admissions—that the government may acquire foreign territory by treaty.”); see also 
Palfrey, supra note 111, at 386 (“[S]carcely a word was said [in 1845] against acquisition of 
territory by the treaty-making power . . . .”). The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged 
(though never held) that the United States may annex foreign territory through treaty. See 
Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945) (“It is no longer doubted that the 
United States may acquire territory by . . . treaty . . . .”); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 32 (1907) 
(“It is too late in the history of the United States to question the right of acquiring territory by 
treaty.”). 
 148.  Citizens of the Republic of Texas referred to themselves as “Texians,” not “Texans.” 
Dorman H. Winfrey, Mirabeau H. Lamar and Texas Nationalism, 59 S.W. HIST. QUART. 184, 
188 (1955). 
 149.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 652 (1844); LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, 
at 92. 
 150.  See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1845) (statement of Rep. Sample) 
(“[T]his question was a new one, so far as regarded the power of the House to act on the 
subject.”); id. app. at 84 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle) (“It was now, for the first time, after 
the lapse of almost three score years and ten, that we were called to exercise a power hitherto 
latent, and which had remained undiscovered, or at least unused, all that time.”); id. app. at 215 
(statement of Rep. Seymour) (“There is not, sir, a solitary case to be found in the whole history 
of our legislation . . . for a period of more than half a century, in which foreign territory has been 
acquired by the action of the legislative power alone.”); id. app. at 411 (statement of Rep. 
Rayner) (characterizing legislative annexation as entirely “unsanctioned by national usage”). 
 151.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (quoting 
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010)). 
 152.  Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)). 
 153.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 72 (1845) (statement of Rep. Sample). 
Others were less diplomatic: “[I]t was a new and monstrous heresy on the [C]onstitution, got up 
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treatment of historical practice suggests a wisdom to Sample’s 
skepticism.154 
Part II.A.1 tracks individual congressmen’s assertions that the 
power to annex foreign territory is too important to have been left to 
implication. Part II.A.2 rounds out the great-powers objection to 
annexing Texas by providing textual and structural support for a 
reading of the Admissions Clause that forbids Congress to admit 
foreign territory directly to statehood. 
1. The Great-Powers Objection.  Echoing McCulloch, and 
prefiguring NFIB and Kebodeaux, opponents of acquiring Texas 
converged on a basic objection: annexation of foreign territory was 
too important a constitutional power to have been left to implication. 
Senator William Archer observed that congressional “powers of 
principal order” were enumerated “in one place, and with each 
other.”155 Acquiring foreign land was a fateful undertaking—it could 
“change the whole character of the government.”156 Could it be 
believed that “if a power far larger than any of these principal 
powers . . . was intended to be given,” the Framers would have failed 
to mention it?157 How could annexationists account for “this great 
power[’s]” omission from the schedule of enumeration?158 
Annexation-through-implication could not be squared with the act’s 
“extraordinary importance,” or with the painstaking scheme of 
legislative empowerment.159 Others esteemed annexation a “very 
important and high power,”160 a “distinct, substantive, independent 
power,”161 “peculiarly important,”162 “so vast and responsible a 
 
. . . for the mere purpose of carrying a measure by a bare majority of Congress, that could not be 
carried by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.” Id. at 304 (statement of Sen. Choate). 
 154.  Very recently, the Court “put significant weight upon historical practice” in interpreting 
the Recess Appointments Clause. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 
2559 (2014) (emphasis in original). Regardless of the subject matter, the “Court has treated 
[historical] practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that 
practice is subject to dispute.” Id. at 2560 (collecting several cases). 
 155.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 328 (1845) (statement of Sen. Archer). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. app. at 85 (statement of Rep. Brengle). 
 161.  Id. at 188 (statement of Rep. Barnard). Chief Justice Marshall used each of these 
descriptors in McCulloch. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819) 
(labeling as “great substantive and independent” those powers that cannot be implied as 
incidental to an enumerated power); id. at 421–22 (claiming that “distinct and independent” 
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power,”163 and a “proposition so important.”164 Annexation was the 
“the main question” to which associated enumerations seemed 
“incidental” by comparison.165 
Proponents of annexation pointed to the Admissions Clause of 
Article IV, Section 3, which provides that “[n]ew States may be 
admitted by the Congress into this Union.”166 Were these not the 
“plainest and broadest words known to the English language”?167 The 
Constitution’s text interposed “nothing to limit the constitutional 
power of Congress” to admit new states.168 For Congressman James 
Pollock, though, such offhand literalism elided a crucial structural 
inquiry. If the power to admit implies the power to acquire in order to 
admit, “the incident is superior to the principal; the implied power 
more important than the power granted.”169 Although in most 
instances “the major proposition may and does include the 
minor . . . here the minor is made to include the major, which is an 
absurdity.”170 
Likewise, Congressman Kenneth Rayner warned that failing to 
police the concept of incidentality “would convert this government 
into one of unlimited and undefinable power.”171 Annexationists had 
 
powers cannot be exercised without a “place among the enumerated powers of [Congress]”). It 
seems extremely unlikely that someone would have independently composed this precise 
configuration of words, but I also doubt that a Whig congressman would have consciously 
declined to invoke Marshall’s authority on this divisive constitutional issue. The Globe gives no 
indication that Barnard drew his words or ideas from McCulloch. 
 162.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 339 (1845) (statement of Rep. Garrett 
Davis). 
 163.  Id. at 125 (statement of Rep. Kennedy). 
 164.  Id. at 191 (statement of Rep. McIlvaine). 
 165.  Id. at 121 (statement of Rep. Sample). This Note does not consider whether 
annexation is somehow more or less important than the associated power to admit new states. 
 166.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; see Kmiec, supra note 27, at 19 (“Congress’ power to 
admit new states, it was argued, was the basis of constitutional power to [e]ffect the 
annexation.”). 
 167.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1845) (statement of Rep. Dean); see also id. 
at 281 (statement of Rep. Morehead) (characterizing the argument as follows: “The 
[C]onstitution said that Congress might admit new States into the Union; Texas was [to be] a 
new State; ergo, Congress might admit Texas into the Union.”). 
 168.  Id. at 122 (statement of Rep. Dean). 
 169.  Id. app. at 359 (statement of Rep. Pollock).  
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. app. at 411 (statement of Rep. Rayner). Almost 170 years later, Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded that characterizing the ACA’s minimum-coverage provision as “incidental” 
to the Commerce power “would work a substantial expansion of federal authority.” Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012). 
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forgotten that “implied power[s] must be proper, as well as 
necessary.”172 Rayner thus shoehorned his structural intuition into the 
Necessary and Proper Clause’s text, as Chief Justice Roberts would 
later do.173 Rayner analogized annexation for the sake of admission to 
the seizure of private bullion in order to coin money, or the 
impressment of sailors in order to provide and maintain a navy.174 All 
three “absurdities” would warp the constitutional structure through a 
licentious reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause.175 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also exposed the joint 
resolution’s perceived constitutional deficiencies in a scathing report 
denouncing the proposed annexation of Texas. The Committee, too, 
argued that territorial annexation was too important a legislative 
topic to be discovered through the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
Incidental powers must be “fair, not forced, accidents” of their 
enumerated parents.176 The Constitution nowhere mentioned a 
congressional annexation power, “as might have been expected, 
supposing it contemplated.”177 Annexationists derived this power 
from “a single line in the Constitution”: the Admissions Clause.178 
“How brief the phrase, how pregnant the import, if the widest of the 
interpretations claimed for it is to be adopted!”179 As the Committee 
contended, that clause—“so circumscribed in words, and inserted . . . 
in no important connection in the Constitution”—could not 
accommodate the claimed power’s “indefiniteness and magnitude.”180 
So the Committee specifically asserted that annexation was too great 
to be accomplished through implication, and it more broadly 
suggested that a vast and important power should not be inferred 
from an enumerated relative if the granted power was apparently not 
 
 172.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner). 
 173.  Roberts explained that “[e]ven if the individual mandate is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s 
insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for making those 
reforms effective.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592. 
 174.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner).  
 175.  Id. 
 176.  S. REP. NO. 28-79 (1845) [hereinafter TEXAS REPORT], in 6 COMPILATION OF 
REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789-1901, FIRST 
CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, TO FIFTY-SIXTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 78, 81 (1901) 
[hereinafter REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS]. 
 177.  Id. at 83. 
 178.  Id. at 92. 
 179.  Id. In other words, the Constitution “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.” 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 180.  TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 92. 
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significant enough to warrant inclusion in Article I, Section 8’s 
fraternity of “great outlines.”181 
Congressman Francis Brengle emphasized annexation’s 
importance by examining the rest of Article IV, Section 3. Under that 
section’s Property Clause, Congress may also “dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States.”182 If the power to dispose of 
territory was “a matter of so much interest” as to induce its 
enumeration, why was the power to acquire territory—so “high and 
important an act”—not also mentioned if Congress was supposed to 
possess it?183 As Brengle remarked, “Here was the proper place to 
insert it, and yet not a word was said about it. Surely the one power 
was as important as the other.”184 
For what it might be worth, constitutional critics of annexing 
Texas also anticipated the peculiar variant of great-powers thinking 
that Chief Justice Roberts introduced in NFIB: that Congress may 
not create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated 
power, thereby drawing within its regulatory ambit something 
properly outside of it.185 If an annexation power followed from the 
power to admit new states, Congressman Daniel Barnard reasoned, 
“the incident precedes, and actually creates, the principal power. 
There is no subject-matter for the principal power to operate upon, 
till the incident has acted.”186 Surely this was “a new discovery in the 
way of incidental powers.”187 On the same principle, Congress could 
acquire foreign territory in order to establish post roads or conduct a 
census there.188 But Article IV, Section 3’s cognate clauses conferred 
 
 181.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Senator Willie Mangum 
similarly noted the “peculiar position which [the Admissions Clause] occupied in that 
instrument. . . . It was not placed in juxtaposition to the enumerated powers of Congress, but 
was found in the third section of the fourth article, separate from the enumerated powers of 
Congress.” CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Mangum). 
 182.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 183.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (statement of Rep. Brengle). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012). 
 186.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 350 (1845) (statement of Rep. Barnard); 
see also id. (“[T]he Texian territory must be brought into the United States, and under its 
jurisdiction, before the power to admit a State into the Union out of it can begin to operate.”). 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  See id. (offering a slightly different example—annexation of foreign territory in order 
to regulate commerce between such land and the United States “on the footing of commerce 
between the States”).  
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no “power of acquisition, or authority of primary character.”189 Both 
clauses spoke instead to the “auxiliary power of arrangement and 
regulation of subjects already, or by some other warrant to be 
brought within the jurisdiction of the government.”190 In other words, 
the enumerated power to regulate territory and property did not 
“confe[r] as an incident upon Congress the power to acquire territory 
and property to furnish something to govern and to regulate.”191 
2. Structural and Functionalist Arguments Against Admissions 
Clause Literalism.  The argument that Texas’s annexation was too 
important to be left to implication depends, of course, on the 
assumption that the Admissions Clause did not itself authorize 
foreign acquisitions. (If it did, the power would be enumerated, not 
implied.) The Clause itself seems capacious enough: “New States may 
be admitted by the Congress.”192 But admitted from what territory? 
This Subsection does not exhaustively survey the Framing 
generation’s subjective hopes and expectations (if any) about how the 
Clause would apply, nor does it reconstruct the putative semantic 
content of “new” and “state” at the time of ratification.193 It instead 
summarizes anti-annexationists’ powerful rejoinder to Admissions 
Clause literalism: that Congress may admit new states only from the 
 
 189.  Id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 193.  Immediately after Hawaii’s annexation, one public-minded lawyer offered a restrictive 
originalist take on congressional power under the Admissions Clause. See James W. Stillman, A 
New Method of Acquiring Territory, 10 GREEN BAG 373, 375 (1898) (“[T]he provision of the 
Constitution authorizing Congress to admit new States was intended by its authors to apply only 
to such States as might be formed out of territory already belonging to the United States and 
out of such other territory as it might afterwards acquire by the treaty-making power and by 
conquest.”). But perhaps because the Articles of Confederation explicitly authorized Canada’s 
admission to the old Confederation, an informed citizen might have understood the 
Constitution’s Admissions Clause to permit foreign annexations, too. See ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XI (“Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the 
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to all the advantages of this 
Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to 
by nine States.”). Then again, Article XI explicitly authorized foreign annexations; the 
Admissions Clause did not. This shift may have been a deliberate effort to disallow legislative 
annexation. Or perhaps the Framers intentionally sidestepped the issue in order to preserve a 
precarious coalition, allowing later generations to fix the Admissions Clause’s geographic scope 
through resort to structural and functionalist arguments that experience might illuminate. 
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territories in existence when the Constitution was ratified or from 
land later acquired through treaty.194  
Especially because the rest of Article IV speaks only to domestic 
concerns,195 the great-powers concept should inform our 
interpretation of the Admissions Clause’s surface ambiguity; that is, 
we should resolve any semantic doubt against an enumerated power’s 
directly encompassing legislative objects that seem too important not 
to have been unequivocally authorized.196 Congressmen marshaled the 
following six arguments to discredit an interpretation of the 
Admissions Clause that would allow Congress to admit foreign 
territory directly to statehood. The stronger their arguments, the 
more purely great-powers principles apply to the annexation of 
Texas.197 
First, history had demonstrated that the treaty power was the 
sole governmental means of acquiring foreign territory.198 Annexation 
through treaty had been “sanctioned by a number of precedents”199—
 
 194.  Or, technically, from land acquired through discovery or military conquest. For several 
congressional assertions of the Admissions Clause’s limited geographic domain, with varying 
levels of historical substantiation, see CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1845) (statement 
of Rep. Sample); id. at 188 (statement of Rep. Barnard); id. at 190 (statement of Rep. 
Stephens); id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead); id. at 292 (statement of Sen. Rives); id. at 
321 (statement of Sen. Simmons); id. at 391 (statement of Sen. Barrow). 
 195.  The Admissions Clause is “immediately followed by two distinct provisions which limit 
the exercise of the power, and which, by their very terms, are confined to the United States.” Id. 
app. at 385 (statement of Sen. Berrien). Why would “the grant of the power relate to one 
subject and the limitation to another; the power to foreign, the limitation to domestic States?” 
Id. It is much more likely that “the same subject was in the minds of the framers of the 
[C]onstitution, in granting the power, as in prescribing its limitation.” Id. 
 196.  Perhaps great-powers concerns are themselves responsible for this perception of 
textual ambiguity. See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the 
Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (explaining how extratextual 
considerations such as structural inferences, customary practice, and anticipated consequences 
can shape constitutional interpreters’ initial perceptions of textual clarity). 
 197.  In any event, this Admissions Clause defense applies only to foreign territory annexed 
and admitted to statehood simultaneously. No enumerated power directly authorized Hawaii’s 
statutory annexation to the lesser status of a federal territory. See infra note 276 and 
accompanying text. 
 198.  For several endorsements of the exclusivity of treaty-based annexation, see CONG. 
GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1845) (statement of Rep. Caleb Smith); id. at 121 (statement 
of Rep. John Davis); id. at 137 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis); id. at 190 (statement of Rep. 
Adams); id. at 279 (statement of Sen. Morehead); id. at 292 (statement of Sen. Rives); id. at 321 
(statement of Sen. Simmons); id. app. at 71 (statement of Rep. Sample); id. app. at 216 
(statement of Rep. Seymour); id. app. at 359 (statement of Rep. Barnard); id. app. at 410 
(statement of Rep. Rayner). 
 199.  Id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead). 
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Louisiana,200 Florida,201 and the earlier-attempted Texas agreement.202 
This unbroken progression demonstrated the treaty power’s 
exclusivity as “the only legitimate construction of the constitution.”203 
Treating for foreign territory had become “our settled policy,”204 the 
proper course “from the first organization of the government to the 
present time.”205 The federal government had likely resorted to the 
treaty process out of a sense of constitutional obligation, given that 
“there had been frequent occasion for using [the congressional 
annexation power], had its existence been known.”206 Why did 
annexationists let themselves suffer such an excruciating 
embarrassment—the Texas treaty’s failure—if there had been a much 
simpler procedural alternative consistent with the Constitution? 
Second, because no one doubted that the United States could 
validly acquire foreign territory through treaty, annexationists would 
bizarrely locate the same constitutional power in multiple sets of 
federal actors. An expansive reading of the Admissions Clause would 
thus “destroy the marks and the lines of division” in the 
Constitution.207 The Framers could not have countenanced an 
institutional race to the negotiating table, granting a concurrent 
annexation authority “to be exercised by the first which might seize 
upon its subject.”208 
 
 200.  Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200. 
 201.  Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and 
His Catholic Majesty, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252. 
 202.  See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 652 (1844) (documenting the Senate’s 
rejection of an annexation treaty with the Republic of Texas).  
 203.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead). 
 204.  Id. app. at 72 (statement of Rep. Sample). 
 205.  Id. app. at 215 (statement of Rep. Seymour); see also TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, 
at 81 (“The foreign territory which the nation has acquired having come through the avenue of 
the treaty-making power of the Government, the opinion until very recently has prevailed 
universally that this was the sole avenue through which it could be derived.”).  
 206.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 84 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle); see 
also id. (“When this measure of annexation was first proposed, who thought of resorting to the 
legislation of Congress to effect it? No resort was thought of but to the treaty-making power.”). 
But perhaps a starting sample of three treaties and no joint resolutions was insufficient to 
“liquidate[] and ascertai[n]” any original constitutional uncertainty regarding annexation. THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 183 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). 
Regardless, the annexation saga demonstrates that Professor Baude’s desire to tether judges to 
concrete historical practices cannot avoid irreducibly subjective line-drawing problems. 
 207.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle).  
 208.  Id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis); see also Helvidius No. II, reprinted in 
1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 621, 625–26 (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 
RICE IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2014  10:37 PM 
2015] TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION 747 
Third, and relatedly, if Congress may acquire foreign territory, it 
may also exercise any powers necessary and proper to effectuate its 
annexation power. Such powers would logically include the 
appointment of ambassadors and foreign ministers, which Article II 
explicitly assigns to the president.209 A founding generation acutely 
concerned with achieving international recognition210 would surely not 
have tolerated multiple, perhaps dueling, ensembles of American 
diplomatic representatives.211 
Fourth, a congressional annexation power would allow fleeting 
majorities to transform the “character and the destiny of the 
Republic.”212 A legislature permitted to acquire Texas could also 
“receive England, Ireland, Holland, and the world.”213 A “fanatical 
majority” intoxicated with “temporary ascendancy” might annex 
Cuba, Haiti, Liberia, or China directly to statehood.214 Worse still, 
such momentous judgments would be entirely immune from 
reflection and reversal, because states simply do not deprive 
themselves of their equal suffrage in the Senate.215 If slightly more 
than one-third of the states may defeat alliances with foreign powers, 
how could annexationists plausibly maintain that a bare majority of 
senators—partnered with the right minority of state delegations in the 
House—may consummate an essentially unamendable political 
alliance?216 
 
1867) (“A concurrent authority in two independent departments to perform the same function 
with respect to the same thing, would be as awkward in practice as it is unnatural in theory. . . . 
[A]ll the powers of government, of which a partition is so carefully made among the several 
branches, would be thrown into absolute hotchpot, and exposed to a general scramble.”). 
 209.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 85 (1845) (statement of Rep. Brengle). 
 210.  See generally David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early 
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010) (interpreting American constitution-making as an effort to achieve 
full recognition from the European-based community of sovereign states). 
 211.  Three decades earlier, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report maintained that 
“[t]he nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and unity of design.” REP. 
OF SEN. BIBB (1816), in 6 REPORTS OF COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 176, 
at 21. 
 212.  TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 92. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1845) (statement of Sen. Morehead). 
 215.  See U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate.”). As the Court noted in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866), the 
annexation of Texas “made important and permanent changes in the relative importance of 
States and sections.” Id. at 500; see also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869) 
(claiming that Texas “entered into an indissoluble relation” in 1845).  
 216.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1845) (statement of Rep. Winthrop). 
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The smaller States never would have yielded their consent to having 
such a power placed any where but where the States stood on an 
equal footing, had all the same voice, and all the same weight. . . . 
[No other power] touched so nearly State interests and State 
sovereignty as the power of acquiring territory and dividing it up 
into States. Had the idea ever entered their minds that Congress was 
to have the power of admitting foreign States, the small States would 
have withdrawn from the convention at once.217 
Fifth and sixth, anti-annexationists noted two final oddities 
entailed by an “incidental” acquisition power. The United States 
would thereby purport to bind foreign governments through ordinary 
municipal laws. In this sense, Congressman Rayner argued, federal 
statutes were “inoperative and void” beyond the Republic’s 
borders.218 And annexationists defended the present joint resolution 
on the grounds that Texas would literally become a “New State[]”219 
upon annexation; Congress presumably could not acquire foreign 
territory without immediately admitting it to statehood.220 But 
annexing territory and admitting it to statehood “would necessarily 
comprehend the entire substance of [mere annexation], and at the 
same time be of a much higher and more comprehensive character.”221 
To suppose that Congress may “accomplish the major, with an 
admission of its incompetency as to the minor included object . . . 
leaves no further room for sophistry.”222 
*          *          * 
 
 217.  Id. app. at 392 (statement of Sen. Barrow); see also Graber, supra note 126, at 89 
(endorsing the argument that “a framing generation concerned with preserving a sectional 
balance of power was unlikely to have sanctioned mere majorities to determine the course of 
American expansion”). 
 218.  CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 411 (1845) (statement of Rep. Rayner). 
For similar formulations of this objection, see id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Morehead), id. app. 
at 72 (statement of Rep. Sample), id. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis), and id. app. 
at 350 (statement of Rep. Barnard); cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950) 
(rejecting the extraterritorial application of federal constitutional rights to nonresident aliens). 
 219.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 220.  See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 340 (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis) 
(“[S]ome gentlemen involve themselves in a solecism. They concede that Congress has not the 
power to annex Texas as a territory, but may admit her as a State.”). 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  TEXAS REPORT, supra note 176, at 99. The annexationists of 1898 conveniently 
disregarded any earlier stipulations of “incompetency as to the minor included object.” See infra 
Part II.B.2. 
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President Polk signed the joint resolution annexing and 
admitting Texas on December 29, 1845.223 But this act remained an 
anomaly in the history of American territorial expansion. Although 
the United States enlarged its borders on three separate occasions 
over the next quarter century, it acquired each of these possessions 
through the more mathematically cumbersome treaty process.224 In 
fact, the Supreme Court overlooked (or ignored) the Texas departure 
in 1890, when it declared that “[t]he power to acquire territory . . . is 
derived from the treaty-making power and the power to declare and 
carry on war.”225 
B. Hawaii 
Strikingly, American efforts to acquire Hawaii mirrored the two-
step process undertaken in 1845. The McKinley administration first 
negotiated an annexation treaty in 1897, but the Senate failed to ratify 
it.226 Only then did annexationists propose a joint resolution to annex 
the Hawaiian islands,227 which would require mere majority approval 
by both houses. 
 
 223.  Joint Resolution for the Admission of the State of Texas into the Union, J. Res. 1, 29th 
Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1845); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 133, at 1597. 
 224.  Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico 
(Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo), U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 912; Treaty with Mexico 
(Gadsden Purchase), U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031; Treaty Concerning the Cession of 
the Russian Possessions in North America (Alaska-Purchase Treaty), U.S.-Russ., June 20, 1867, 
15 Stat. 539. 
 225.  Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 
U.S. 1, 42 (1890); see Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 507 (1871) (“The war power and the treaty-
making power, each carries with it authority to acquire territory. Louisiana, Florida, and Alaska 
were acquired under the latter, and California under both.”). Only in 1901 did the Court 
explicitly assume the constitutionality of statutory annexation. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
1, 196 (1901) (“The territory thus acquired [by treaty or conquest] is acquired as absolutely as if 
the annexation were made, as in the case of Texas and Hawaii, by an act of Congress.”). This 
ipse dixit was a “complete reversal” of the Court’s earlier pronouncements. Brock, supra note 
118, at 733 n.252. Professor Mark Graber downplays the importance of this “single sentence in 
an opinion concerned with other issues,” because neither party’s attorney had addressed the 
constitutionality of annexation through joint resolution. Graber, supra note 126, at 90. “Such 
unsupported dictum is not normally considered sufficient to establish any proposition of 
constitutional law. . . . Whether the United States may annex a foreign country by joint 
resolution has never been the subject of debate before the justices. That issue, under 
conventional understandings of legal precedent, remains undecided.” Id. 
 226.  LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111, at 108. 
 227.  See JOHN W. FOSTER, II DIPLOMATIC MEMOIRS 174 (1909) (“Owing to the opposition 
of many of the Democratic Senators to the Hawaiian Treaty and the facility of obstruction and 
delay in that body, it was decided to attempt to bring about the annexation by joint resolution, 
following the precedent of the annexation of Texas.”). 
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Congress has acquired foreign territory without admitting it 
directly to statehood just once—on July 7, 1898, when President 
McKinley signed the joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian islands.228 
Hawaii’s annexation presents an ideal fact pattern for consideration 
of the great-powers theory, since it requires no disputable 
assumptions about the Admissions Clause’s meaning (that is, whether 
Congress may admit foreign territory directly to statehood). The 
power to acquire territory would undoubtedly enable Congress to 
exercise its Admissions power. After all, Congress admitted the 
earlier-acquired Territory of Hawaii to statehood in 1959.229 But if 
territorial annexation is a great power, Congress may not infer an 
annexation power in order to facilitate the exercise of its Admissions 
power, however convenient or useful available territory might be for 
that purpose. 
In 1845, opponents of annexation argued that territorial 
acquisition is precisely the kind of power that must be conferred 
expressly, if at all.230 Their objections apply perforce to Hawaii, since 
no clause directly authorized the joint resolution annexing Hawaii.231 
But in 1898, none of the critics’ constitutional grievances sounded in 
the logic of “vast powers”232 and “great objects.”233 Instead, 
congressmen quarreled over whether they even needed to ground 
legislative action in the Constitution’s text, and whether historical 
practice validated or precluded congressional acquisition of territory 
not immediately admitted to statehood.234 
I suspect that most congressmen who opposed the 1898 joint 
resolution on constitutional grounds would have gladly characterized 
 
 228.  Joint Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, 
J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 30 Stat. 750 (July 7, 1898); H. WAYNE MORGAN, WILLIAM 
MCKINLEY AND HIS AMERICA 225 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 229.  More precisely, Congress delegated the Admissions power to the president. See Act of 
Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (prescribing terms for Hawaii’s admission to the 
Union as a state); Proclamation No. 3309, 24 Fed. Reg. 6868 (1959) (admitting Hawaii as a 
state). 
 230.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 231.  But see infra note 252 and accompanying text (describing three annexationists’ 
contention that Congress may annex foreign territory under a strikingly capacious reading of 
the General Welfare Clause). 
 232.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). 
 233.  Id. at 418. Senator William Lindsay did describe annexation as “the very highest 
conceivable legislative power,” but not in the course of arguing that it was too important to be 
employed as incidental to a granted power. 31 CONG. REC. 6671 (1898) (statement of Sen. 
Lindsay). 
 234.  See infra Part II.B.1–.2. 
RICE IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2014  10:37 PM 
2015] TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION 751 
annexation as a great power and denied, as a theoretical matter, that 
the Admissions Clause empowers Congress to acquire foreign 
territory and admit it to statehood immediately. But virtually no one 
dared to relitigate Texas during the debates over annexing Hawaii.235 
Far easier to argue that only the treaty power can acquire foreign 
territory, save the constitutionally special (and obviously 
distinguishable) situation of foreign land being admitted directly to 
statehood. 
Merely denying Texas’s precedential relevance would not have 
precluded anyone from labeling annexation a great power, of course. 
And perhaps no one as much as pondered the concept in 1898 or 
considered its application to Hawaii. But because annexationists 
relied so crucially—perhaps entirely—on historical precedents, critics 
apparently made a calculated political choice simply to concede 
Texas’s constitutionality and focus their energies on contrasting the 
relevantly dissimilar facts of 1845 and 1898. 
Part II.B.1 examines dueling congressional claims regarding the 
need to anchor any congressional annexation power in the 
constitutional text. If the power were inherent, after all, it would be 
exempt from great-powers strictures.236 Part II.B.2 questions 
annexationists’ reliance on Texas as a precedent for acquiring foreign 
land without simultaneously admitting it to statehood. It then 
criticizes their argument that if Congress may admit foreign land 
directly to statehood, surely it may annex such land to the lesser 
constitutional status of a federal territory. Part II.B.2 concludes by 
observing that congressional powers historically defended as essential 
to nationhood are especially likely to be classifiable as great powers. 
1. “Powers Inherent in Sovereignty” Versus the Need for a Textual 
Hook.  At least in 1845, annexationists attempted to derive a 
congressional territorial-expansion power from the Constitution’s 
text. Most advocates of annexing Hawaii simply discarded this quaint 
 
 235.  Senator Donelson Caffery seems to have been the sole exception. See 31 CONG. REC. 
6405 (1898) (statement of Sen. Caffery) (arguing that Texas furnished “nothing more nor less 
than the precedent that a certain political majority in Congress, having political purposes in 
view, voted as for a partisan necessity to take Texas into the Union”); id. at 6480–81 (statement 
of Sen. Caffery) (“[T]he Constitution of the United States was violated in the admission of 
Texas under a joint resolution. . . . She got in by a violation, in my opinion, of the 
Constitution.”). 
 236.  If nationhood itself created legislative authority, the relative greatness of such a power 
would be immaterial. And there would be no need to justify an inherent power as incidental to 
an enumerated one—it would simply exist. 
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approach. Because “the right to extend its territory is inherent in any 
nation,” one congressman argued, “it requires no special provision of 
the Constitution to enable us to annex additional territory.”237 There 
was nothing wrong with venturing outside the Constitution, because 
the “power to annex is a necessary consequence of our existence as a 
sovereign and independent nation.”238 Only a “positive constitutional 
prohibition,” absent here, could have altered this universal baseline.239 
But however seductive the notion that some arm of the U.S. 
government must be able to extend America’s national borders, the 
Tenth Amendment confirms that “delegation alone warrants the 
exercise of any [congressional] power.”240 Even if one grants that the 
federal government must possess a certain power, it does not at all 
follow that Congress may wield that power.241 The Tenth Amendment 
functions as a “positive constitutional prohibition” on congressional 
annexation of foreign territory absent express or incidental 
empowerment, because extraconstitutional national powers are “not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”242 
Constitutional critics of annexing Hawaii vehemently denounced 
the notion of powers inherent in sovereignty. Their unheeded civics 
lesson evinced an admirable dedication to the project of written 
 
 237.  Id. at 5839 (statement of Rep. Henry).  
 238.  Id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell); see also id. at 5914 (statement of Rep. 
Danford) (“[T]he right to acquire additional territory by the Government of the United States 
was one of the inherent rights that belong to sovereign countries.”); id. at 6156 (statement of 
Sen. Teller) (“[T]he United States may add territory to territory without any constitutional 
provision whatever.”); id. at 6334 (statement of Sen. Foraker) (“What does the Constitution of 
the United States say about the annexation of territory? Not one word. . . . I contend that it is 
inherent.”); id. at 6347 (statement of Sen. White) (arguing that Congress may annex territory 
“because this is a nation”); id. at 6369 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“It is sovereign power. It is 
not written in the Constitution.”); id. at 6572 (statement of Sen. Pettus) (characterizing 
territorial annexation as “one of the attributes of government”). 
 239.  Id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell).  
 240.  3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 620 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James Madison 
to the Virginia Ratifying Convention). Madison presumably understood implication to be 
included within delegation. 
 241.  See Stillman, supra note 193, at 375 (“The writer does not deny the power of the 
Federal Government to acquire territory; but he insists that if that is to be done at all, it must be 
done in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution; and unless it can be shown that this 
power has been therein conferred upon Congress either by express grant or by necessary 
implication, it does not exist.”). 
 242.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. For an incisive judicial critique of the notion of powers 
inherent in sovereignty, see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, 
J., dissenting). 
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constitutionalism, and specifically to the idea of a federal legislature 
with limited regulatory competencies.243 “The preservation of the 
constitutional limitations and guarant[ees] is of infinitely greater 
importance” than gratifying today’s ephemeral desires, one 
congressman assured his colleagues.244 Legislative proposals must 
always “ru[n] the ga[u]ntlet of every constitutional safeguard.”245 
Accordingly, congressmen should internalize the maxim that “[i]f it is 
not written in the Constitution or is not implied to carry out some 
written power, then it does not exist.”246 The issue was not whether 
the national government ought to be able to acquire foreign territory, 
but where, within this constitutional system, such a power might 
reside.247 For annexationists’ inherent-powers argument to work, they 
needed to “establish that sovereignty resides in Congress.”248 
Especially because no tribunal would dare to invalidate an 
enlargement of America’s national borders,249 “the consciences of 
Senators ought to be quick and alive to the necessity of observing the 
constitutional limitations in this regard.”250 Territorial annexation was 
 
 243.  Fortunately, the notion of inherent congressional powers has “recently come under 
strong criticism. That skepticism should be extended to” annexation. Baude, supra note 5, at 
1743.  
 244.  31 CONG. REC. 5920 (1898) (statement of Rep. Crumpacker); see id. at 6148 (statement 
of Sen. Bacon) (imploring his colleagues “to consider the question whether or not they have the 
right, under their constitutional obligations, to vote for this resolution, however much they may 
favor the annexation of Hawaii,” because “[n]o senator ought to desire its annexation 
sufficiently to induce him to give his support to an unconstitutional measure”). 
 245.  Id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball). 
 246.  Id. at 6369 (statement of Sen. Allen); see also id. at 6635 (statement of Sen. Allen) 
(“[P]owers not expressly granted or not necessarily implied or proper for the execution of 
granted powers do not exist and can not be constitutionally employed.”); id. at 6671 (statement 
of Sen. Lindsay) (“Is there any other legislative power vested in the Congress? If so, by whom, 
and when and where was the grant made?”). 
 247.  Id. at 6332 (statement of Sen. Turley); see also id. at 6578 (statement of Sen. Mallory) 
(“We do not deny that the United States Government has the power . . . to annex territory. . . . 
[B]ut that right must be exercised in a particular way and through a particular branch of the 
Government of the United States.”); id. at 6667 (statement of Sen. Lindsay) (“Powerful as this 
Government may be . . . it has no power independent of the Constitution—no power self-
existent, to be exercised independently of a constitutional grant, express or implied.”). 
 248.  Id. at 6370 (statement of Sen. Caffery). After all, “Why not the executive, why not the 
judicial, if you please, as well as Congress, if this power can be exercised indiscriminately 
without any regard to the Constitution”? Id.  
 249.  See Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“[I]f the [annexation] question should come up in 
the courts to-day . . . they would undoubtedly hold the legislation valid.”). 
 250.  31 CONG. REC. 6366 (1898) (statement of Sen. Caffery). 
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therefore a “dangerous step, and one that can hardly, if ever, be 
retraced.”251 
To the extent that annexationists in 1898 sought to trace the 
power to any piece of constitutional text, they gestured to the 
General Welfare Clause. This provision supposedly licensed Congress 
to act in any way conducive to the national interest, assuming the 
chosen action wasn’t expressly prohibited.252 But instead of 
articulating a textually grounded case for congressional 
empowerment, most annexationists simply declared the issue settled 
by historical practice. 
2. Characterizing Historical Practice.  When the United States 
acquired territory before 1898, it almost always did so through 
treaty.253 Texas—the sole exception—was admitted to statehood 
immediately, pursuant to the allegedly clear text of the Admissions 
Clause.254 The proposed annexation of Hawaii followed neither of 
these models. Yet annexationists in 1898 confidently announced that 
previous territorial acquisitions had decisively resolved the present 
question of constitutional power. 
a. Dueling Understandings of the Texas Precedent.  There were 
more and less disciplined versions of this argument from historical 
practice. Less laudably, annexationists pommeled a straw man. How, 
they asked, could anyone seriously argue that the United States was 
powerless to acquire territory? That a nation might extend its 
territory was “no longer an open question. . . . [N]or will it ever again 
become a practical, living question before the American people.”255 
The federal government had engaged in territorial expansion 
“repeatedly” since the beginning of the Republic.256 The power to 
annex foreign land had therefore been “settled by this uniform, 
 
 251.  Id. at 6590 (statement of Sen. Mallory). 
 252.  For interpretations of the General Welfare Clause that would effectively grant 
Congress carte blanche and eviscerate the idea of great powers, see id. at 5892 (statement of 
Rep. Pearce), id. at 5910 (statement of Rep. Barham), and id. at 6334 (statement of Sen. 
Foraker). General Welfare Clause textualism is actually more legislatively enabling than the 
theory of powers inherent in sovereignty, because not all convenient or advantageous powers 
can be plausibly said to reside in the United States by virtue of nationhood. 
 253.  See supra notes 143–45, 224 and accompanying text.  
 254.  See supra notes 128, 167–68 and accompanying text.  
 255.  31 CONG. REC. 5840 (1898) (statement of Rep. Henry). 
 256.  Id.  
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unbroken practice for almost a century.”257 “[O]nly the antediluvian” 
would dispute the nation’s ability to acquire new territory.258 
Of course, no one disputed the United States’ power to acquire 
territory through treaty. Critics demanded a demonstration that 
Congress could constitutionally acquire foreign territory (at least 
without promptly admitting it to statehood).259 Rather than point to 
any particular constitutional warrant, annexationists paraded their all-
sufficient talisman: Texas. Even before the lengthy House and Senate 
debates throughout the summer of 1898, a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee report insisted that Congress could constitutionally 
acquire Hawaii “under the precedent that was established in the 
annexation of Texas.”260 The Committee claimed that Texas’s 
annexation through joint resolution “clearly establishes the precedent 
that Congress has the power to annex a foreign State to the territory 
of the United States.”261 But the Committee failed to elaborate on the 
commonly understood constitutional justification for annexing Texas, 
technical conformity with the Admissions Clause; doing so would 
have undermined the precedential value of American history’s sole 
instance of legislative annexation. 
 
 257.  Id. at 5890 (statement of Rep. Grow). 
 258.  Id. at 5981 (statement of Rep. Parker); see id. at 5892 (statement of Rep. Pearce) (“I 
had supposed until this hour that the right of annexing foreign territory was a settled question 
and not open to further discussion.”); id. at 5908 (statement of Rep. Hamilton) (“The 
Constitution of the United States has been interpreted many times in favor of the general power 
of annexation. . . . This is no new question.”); id. at 5919 (statement of Rep. Bromwell) 
(“[T]hese questions are not new and have all been settled by the highest authorities known to 
our system of government. . . . [W]e commenced such annexation in the very infancy of our 
Republic and have continued in that policy down to the present time.”); id. at 5932 (statement 
of Rep. Davidson) (“[T]he same question has been raised five times during our national 
history. . . . [I]t has been passed upon and overruled, so that it now has no standing in court.”); 
id. at 5981 (statement of Rep. Parker) (“It is rather late to talk about the constitutional power of 
the United States to annex territory.”); id. at 5991 (statement of Rep. Graff) (“Our right under 
the Constitution to acquire territory . . . has been too well established by precedents in our own 
history to be questioned.”); id. at 6010 (statement of Rep. Todd) (“[H]appily we have many 
high constitutional authorities as well as historic precedents for the proposed annexation.”); id. 
at 6369 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“It is a settled constitutional doctrine in this country that 
the power to acquire territory exists. It has been exercised for a hundred years, and it is settled. 
Some things get settled by practice, by precedent. It has been settled beyond controversy, and 
no court will ever deny it.”). 
 259.  See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 260.  S. REP. NO. 55-681 (1898) [hereinafter HAWAII REPORT], in 7 REPORTS OF 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 176, at 189, 189; see also Kmiec, supra note 
27, at 19 (“Congress acted in explicit reliance on the procedure followed for the acquisition of 
Texas.”). 
 261.  HAWAII REPORT, supra note 260, at 190. 
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Several annexationist congressmen likewise invoked Texas, 
improving (if only slightly) on their belabored argument from the 
United States government’s periodic practices. Texas was admitted 
“over a new legislative highway which has been blazed so wide and so 
straight that in the present emergency we have a precedent ample 
indeed.”262 In essence, “the Texas precedent has made the votes of a 
majority of both branches of Congress sufficient” to annex foreign 
territory.263 That earlier episode “is on all fours with the very question 
we are now debating,” right down to the failed treaties and course-
correcting joint resolutions.264 Congress had done all of this before;265 
of course annexing Hawaii would be constitutional. 
But Texas was distinguishable in a constitutionally material 
sense: “it was admitted as a State and not as a Territory.”266 
Proponents of annexing Texas had rested on their scrupulously literal 
compliance with the Admissions Clause—they indisputably proposed 
that Congress admit a new state.267 But congressman after 
congressman grumbled that the resolution to annex Hawaii would not 
similarly admit those islands as a state, so Texas was no precedent at 
all.268 If anything, it undermined the constitutional case for Hawaii’s 
 
 262.  31 CONG. REC. 6005 (1898) (statement of Rep. William Smith). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 6572 (statement of Sen. Pettus). 
 265.  For other invocations of the 1845 joint resolution’s precedential status, see id. at 5877 
(statement of Rep. Grosvenor), id. at 5890 (statement of Rep. Grow), id. at 5911 (statement of 
Rep. Barham), and id. at 5991 (statement of Rep. Graff). 
 266.  Id. at 5920 (statement of Rep. Crumpacker); see also ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 504 (1936) (“[T]he method of annexing 
Texas did not constitute a proper precedent for the annexation of a land and people to be 
retained as a possession or in a territorial condition.”); Kmiec, supra note 27, at 20 (“The stated 
justification for the joint resolution [annexing Hawaii]—the previous acquisition of Texas—
simply ignores the reliance the 1845 Congress placed on its power to admit new states.”); 
Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“The [annexation] power . . . cannot properly be claimed under 
the express provision for the admission of new states.”); Stillman, supra note 193, at 378 
(“[T]here is no analogy between the admission of Texas into the Union as a State, and the 
annexation of Hawaii to this country as a Territory by a joint resolution of Congress.”). 
 267.  See supra note 128.  
 268.  See 31 CONG. REC. 5778 (1898) (statement of Rep. Dinsmore) (“You must admit [it] 
as a State. . . . [I]t is feeble of gentlemen to cite Texas as authority for the procedure asked in 
this present emergency.”); id. at 5935 (statement of Rep. Broussard) (“[N]or can [Texas] be 
quoted as a precedent for this ‘scheme,’ for it is not here sought to admit Hawaii into the Union 
as a new State.”); id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball) (“[T]he advocates of this measure have no 
ground to stand upon so far as the annexation of Texas is concerned.”); id. at 6013 (statement of 
Rep. Williams) (“Texas was not ‘annexed’ in the sense in which we to-day are talking about 
‘annexing’ Hawaii. Texas came into this Union by joint resolution under an express power given 
to Congress in the Constitution, ‘to admit new States.’”); id. at 6148 (statement of Sen. Bacon) 
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annexation, because Congress presumably admitted Texas as a state 
precisely because the Constitution excluded the customary territorial 
path as an option.269 
Once annexationists’ cursory claims were swept away, 
congressmen would see that “never in the history of the country ha[d] 
territory been admitted as such by joint resolution.”270 Annexationists 
attempted a “novel and unprecedented proceeding.”271 Acquiring 
foreign land outside constitutional limitations was, if nothing else, “a 
clear departure from American traditions” and an “open 
abandonment of American precedents.”272 In fact, annexationists’ 
initial preference for the treaty form revealed their sympathy with 
this restrained vision of Congress’s annexation power: If Texas stood 
for the proposition that Congress may annex foreign territory under 
any circumstances, why risk the humiliation of another botched 
supermajority ratification? Why not simply introduce a joint 
resolution from the outset if that device was clearly constitutional 
(and ultimately chosen)? Annexationists never marshaled a 
satisfactory response. 
b. Annexationists’ Flawed “Greater Includes the Lesser” 
Argument.  Annexationists answered with a second reason why the 
Texas precedent legitimated Hawaii’s annexation, one that avoided 
contestable premises about the scope of historical practice. In short, 
the greater includes the lesser: given that Congress may lawfully 
annex and admit foreign territory directly to statehood, surely it may 
 
(noting a constitutional “distinction between the authority of Congress to admit a State . . . and 
the power to acquire foreign territory not for the purpose of making it a State”); id. at 6405 
(statement of Sen. Caffery) (“They have not followed the precedent. Take Hawaii in her 
Statehood, such as it may be, if you want to follow the precedent.”); id. at 6518 (statement of 
Sen. Bates) (“‘[A]nalogous facts’ must sustain the application of a precedent. Between the 
annexation of Texas and the proposed annexation of Hawaii there are no analogous facts.”); id. 
at 6587 (statement of Sen. Spooner) (“Texas was not a Territory. . . . [W]here has Congress ever 
admitted a Territory as a Territory?”); id. at 6667 (statement of Sen. Lindsay) (“Congress 
admitted [Texas] not as mere territory, but as a sovereign State. . . . This much this precedent 
establishes. It does not go a single step beyond the admission of an organized Republic as a 
State under the express grant of power by the Constitution to the Congress to admit new 
States.”). 
 269.  Congressman Thomas Ball, a Texan, suggested that Congress chose to treat Texas 
differently than previous territorial acquisitions “for the purpose alone of coming within the 
constitutional power to admit new States.” Id. at 5976 (statement of Rep. Ball). 
 270.  Id. at 5920 (statement of Rep. Crumpacker). 
 271.  Id. at 6518 (statement of Sen. Bates). 
 272.  Id. at 6668 (statement of Sen. Lindsay).  
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merely acquire such territory to create a less momentous (and more 
easily dissoluble) political connection.273 Just because Congress had 
not yet annexed alien territory to an “inferior relation, it does not 
follow that we have not that power when we have exercised the 
greater power.”274 It would take “some lawyer” to explain why “the 
exercise of the power which admits a State to that high relation . . . 
can not acquire territory out of which a State can be created.”275 
This greater-includes-the-lesser argument exploited opponents’ 
pragmatic concession of Texas’s constitutionality. But to the 
disinterested student of American constitutionalism, it gets the 
inquiry exactly backward. Because the Admissions Clause is facially 
ambiguous—may Congress admit any pocket of earth to statehood, or 
just presently owned U.S. territory?—analyzing the “lesser” issue of 
annexation first can help decide which interpretation of the “greater” 
Admissions power to adopt. If, on the best reading of the 
Constitution, Congress may not constitutionally enlarge our national 
boundaries (whether or not it simultaneously increases the pool of 
states), then Congress may not increase the pool of states through an 
enlargement of our national boundaries. 
In other words, we should prefer an interpretation of the 
Admissions Clause that accommodates a more constitutionally 
coherent greater-includes-the-lesser argument. The annexationists of 
1898 should not have invoked Texas to bootstrap their way into 
constitutionality without some textual warrant for Hawaii’s legislative 
acquisition as a territory. Without Texas, Hawaii’s annexation was 
constitutionally indefensible.276 This stark truth reveals the 
unsoundness of an interpretation of the Admissions Clause that 
rendered Hawaii’s annexation plainly constitutional on greater-
includes-the-lesser grounds. 
Once opponents of annexing Hawaii assumed Texas’s 
constitutionality, they deprived themselves of the ability to oppose 
 
 273.  Id. at 5910–11 (statement of Rep. Barham); see id. at 6148 (statement of Sen. Elkins) 
(asking “why, if [Congress] can admit a State, it can not admit anything less than a State”). 
 274.  Id. at 6587 (statement of Sen. Teller). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  See Kmiec, supra note 27, at 20–21 (concluding that “[i]t is . . . unclear which 
constitutional power Congress exercised when it acquired Hawaii by joint resolution”). To be 
sure, acquiring Hawaii must have greatly facilitated Congress’s ability to “provide and maintain 
a Navy.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. But if annexation is too important to be discovered 
through implication, it is irrelevant which enumerated power might profit from a great-powers 
violation.  
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annexation on great-powers grounds. Instead, they were left to 
protest the apparent lack of an annexation power under traditional 
modes of inquiry.277 By conceding that the Constitution did expressly 
permit legislative annexation in some instances, these opponents 
assumed the enormous burden of explaining why the lesser power to 
annex foreign territory was not included within the Article IV, 
Section 3 power to annex foreign territory and admit it to statehood. 
Conceding Texas’s constitutionality avoided a messy and futile 
struggle, to be sure, and enabled opponents to draw attention to 
annexationists’ chief vulnerability: that Hawaii fell outside the 
Admissions Clause rationale for acquiring Texas.278 But Hawaii was 
ultimately annexed, and the modern Supreme Court has implicitly 
acknowledged the validity of statutory annexation under a greater-
includes-the-lesser theory.279 The annexation of Hawaii therefore 
represents an unfortunate road not taken in the life of great powers—
a missed opportunity for a group of conscientious constitutional 
dissenters to explicate a vital structural precept that now figures to 
play a leading role in constitutional law. 
c. The Overlap Between Alleged Inherent Powers and Great 
Powers.  These scholarly squabbles over inherent and enumerated 
congressional power did, however, contribute something to great-
powers theory. Annexationists evidently invoked alleged sovereign 
prerogatives because their claimed power was not enumerated and 
could not be fairly characterized as merely incidental to one or more 
granted powers. As Professor Baude has noted, the Supreme Court 
originally sustained a federal eminent-domain power through 
 
 277.  Writing in the Green Bag in 1898, James W. Stillman concluded that “the action of 
Congress . . . was entirely without constitutional authority” because “there is no provision of the 
Constitution authorizing the passage of the joint resolution in question.” Stillman, supra note 
193, at 375, 378. Somewhat more opaquely, former Secretary of State John W. Foster later 
recalled that Hawaii’s annexation was “repugnant” to him “because of its evasion of the 
constitutional provision.” FOSTER, supra note 227, at 174. 
 278.  See supra notes 266–68. 
 279.  In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), a landmark case on whether habeas 
corpus protections extend to Guantánamo Bay detainees, all nine Justices assumed that 
Congress may annex foreign territory under the Admissions Clause. See id. at 765 (asserting that 
“[t]he Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and 
govern territory”); id. at 839 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Insular Cases all concerned Territories 
[including Hawaii] acquired by Congress under its Article IV authority . . . .”). Justice Kennedy 
wrote for a five-Justice majority, and three Justices joined Justice Scalia’s dissent.  
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identical considerations of inherent power and national sovereignty.280 
The Court concluded that “[s]uch an authority is essential to [the 
United States’] independent existence and perpetuity. . . . The right is 
the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from 
sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law.”281 But the 
concept of inherent powers cannot be squared with the idea of great 
powers, which assumes that every congressional power (great or not) 
ultimately owes its existence to the Constitution’s text.282 If 
annexation and eminent domain are any indication, congressional 
powers that have historically been justified through reference to 
unfalsifiable assertions of national sovereignty are especially apt to be 
categorized as great powers.283 
III.  THE FUTURE OF GREAT POWERS 
This Note’s identification of territorial annexation as a great 
power highlights two essential avenues for future research. First, 
because judges will not (and should not) declare Texas and Hawaii 
unconstitutional, the legal community must offer a credible 
justification for applying the great-powers doctrine inconsistently if it 
is to flourish as a judicially administrable principle. And second, the 
Texas-annexation debates demonstrate that legal actors have 
squarely confronted great-powers limitations without summoning 
McCulloch’s famed terminology.284 It is therefore an open question 
whether the Supreme Court actually issued any great-powers holdings 
between McCulloch and NFIB. In fact, under a newly persuasive 
reading of Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court has actually decided that 
 
 280.  See Baude, supra note 5, at 1800–04 (recounting the birth of modern eminent-domain 
jurisprudence). 
 281.  Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1875); see also United States v. Jones, 109 
U.S. 513, 518 (1883) (“The power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the 
right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent government. It is an incident of 
sovereignty, and . . . requires no constitutional recognition.”); Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional 
Aspects of Federal Housing, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 131, 141 (1935) (“[I]n relation to the eminent 
domain power the ‘necessary and proper’ clause merely recognizes a universal attribute of 
governments, that of being able to obtain by expropriation the lands they require for the 
carrying out of their powers.”). 
 282.  See supra note 236. 
 283.  For one scholar’s list of alleged “inherent sovereign powers construed as ancillary to 
enumerated powers” (but without reference to great-powers limitations), see Gerald L. 
Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 
83 (2004). 
 284.  For a comprehensive list of McCulloch’s great-powers language, see supra notes 63–69 
and accompanying text. 
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involuntary expatriation (citizenship-stripping) is too important a 
power to have been granted to Congress implicitly. 
A. The Need To Justify Inconsistent Application of Great-Powers 
Principles 
Professor Koppelman is right: “It is . . . an open question how 
much of existing law would have to be scrapped if [the great-powers 
idea] were adopted by the courts.”285 In such a world, judges would 
strike down any exercise of an implied power that seemed too 
important to exist without being enumerated286 (or perhaps that 
reached more broadly than the enumerated power it purported to 
effectuate).287 For example, the unenumerated (but plenary) 
congressional power to control immigration, even to the point of 
excluding entire ethnic groups, sure seems more important than the 
enumerated power to specify standardized procedures by which 
individual aliens may become American citizens.288 Likewise, 
Congress’s unwritten power to print vast sums of paper money is not 
clearly inferior to its enumerated power to “coin” money.289 And 
perhaps both of these powers are simply too far-reaching to be 
exercised through implication.290 
In any case, redefining the United States through territorial 
enlargements is as great, substantive, and independent as powers 
come. And even if reasonable minds could differ on the perceived 
importance of annexing foreign territory, Roberts’s NFIB opinion 
would prohibit the Hawaii two-step, whereby Congress uses an 
unenumerated power (acquiring foreign land) to create the necessary 
 
 285.  Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 113. For Koppelman’s somewhat 
extravagant effort to compile a list of possible great powers, see Koppelman, Everybody, supra 
note 13, at 519–20 (citations omitted). 
 286.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 287.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 288.  See Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 113, 117 (identifying 
immigration control as a probable great power under Roberts’s framework). Not surprisingly, 
the Court early on denied the necessity of enumerating this power: “[E]very sovereign nation 
has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such 
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 
(1893) (quoting Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)). 
 289.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; Koppelman, Everybody, supra note 13, at 520. 
 290.  See Ajit V. Pai, Congress and the Constitution: The Legal Tender Act of 1862, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 535, 557 n.133 (1998) (suggesting that the creation of legal-tender notes is too important to 
be inferred through the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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predicate for the eventual exercise of an enumerated power 
(admitting new states).291 
The example of annexation vividly demonstrates that judges 
cannot apply the great-powers doctrine consistently across the full 
range of possible scenarios, Koppelman’s alarmism notwithstanding. 
This is understandable, since they have inherited a jurisprudence—
and a political history—that rarely strained to ensure that implied 
powers were truly incidental to associated enumerated powers and 
were not too important to have been granted by implication.292 But in 
championing this Rip Van Winkle of constitutional law, great-powers 
practitioners must tread carefully to avoid a trenchant critique leveled 
at judicial originalism: that the selective granting of indulgences 
corrupts the concept’s normative rigor and so spoils its intellectual 
appeal.293 
This Note does not aim to delegitimize Texas’s or Hawaii’s 
present political status, retroactively negate their federal 
officeholders’ votes, or inaugurate an intellectually respectable 
“birther” movement.294 These oddly linked states are “deeply 
embedded into our law and lives,”295 and their legality is “no longer a 
viable issue for courts to decide.”296 Texas and Hawaii must therefore 
remain “pragmatic exception[s]”297 to the consistent application of 
great-powers principles. This Note has aimed to show that, barring an 
unlikely constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to acquire 
foreign land, the doctrine will always be beset by at least this glaring 
inconsistency. 
Few governmental practices are as deeply entrenched as the 
components of our national Union. It may be politically conceivable 
to invalidate less foundational arrangements on great-powers 
 
 291.  See supra notes 80–81.  
 292.  The aforementioned annexation episodes are Exhibits A and B, at least with respect to 
the second point. 
 293.  See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 8–9 (2011) (arguing that so-called “faint-
hearted” originalism “undercuts the claim that legitimacy comes from adhering to the original 
meaning of the text adopted by the framers”). 
 294.  For an amusingly bookish effort to demonstrate that President Obama was not actually 
born in Hawaii, see generally JEROME R. CORSI, WHERE’S THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE?: THE 
CASE THAT BARACK OBAMA IS NOT ELIGIBLE TO BE PRESIDENT (2011). 
 295.  Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205 (2006). Gerhardt 
was describing especially canonical judicial decisions, but his language also applies here. 
 296.  Id. at 1206. 
 297.  Scalia, supra note 39, at 140.  
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grounds,298 though practically impossible to eliminate others. But 
regardless of where the line is drawn, proponents of the great-powers 
doctrine must offer a principled justification for following their best 
understanding of the Constitution’s meaning only sometimes; they 
must articulate sufficiently nonarbitrary criteria for subjecting only 
some offending practices to NFIB’s great-powers scrutiny. 
B. Digging Deeper: Involuntary Expatriation as a Hidden Great 
Power 
As Baude299 and Robert Natelson300 have shown, the great-powers 
concept has a much richer intellectual history than NFIB readers may 
have initially realized. It seems extremely improbable that a structural 
principle so theoretically sensible, so substantiated by Founding-era 
legal authorities, must have taken a two-hundred-year vacation after 
McCulloch merely because the phrase “great substantive and 
independent” yields almost no search results.301 The Texas debates 
support my instinct: in one of the most dramatic and constitutionally 
erudite legislative exchanges in American history,302 great powers 
played a starring role—but without appropriating Marshall’s most 
recognizable expression. 
In the era of searchable digital archives, easy congressional 
targets may still exist. For example, at least one senator parsed the 
constitutionality of the Freedmen’s Bureau using the familiar 
Marshallian language of principals and incidents: 
 
 298.  For example, in NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts cast doubt on the constitutionality of the 
ACA’s minimum-coverage provision by claiming that “Congress ha[d] never attempted to rely 
on th[e] power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted 
product.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012). 
 299.  See generally Baude, supra note 5 (cataloguing prominent Founders’ endorsement of 
great-powers principles and attempting to explain widespread resistance to a federal eminent-
domain power in the antebellum era).  
 300.  See generally Natelson, supra note 43 (contending that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause incorporated the agency-law concept of incidental powers). 
 301.  For two obscure exceptions in the U.S. Reports, see supra note 12. 
 302.  See Maltz, supra note 125, at 381, 399 (observing that the Texas debates “raise[d] 
fundamental questions about the structure of the nation” and that “[t]he depth and 
sophistication of the constitutional analysis was often extremely impressive”). The decision to 
annex Hawaii also featured “one of the greatest debates in American congressional history.” 
TYLER DENNETT, AMERICANS IN EASTERN ASIA: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE POLICY OF THE 
UNITED STATES WITH REFERENCE TO CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA IN THE 19TH CENTURY 624 
(1922). 
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[The Thirteenth Amendment] does not enumerate the power to 
establish a Freedmen’s Bureau as a constitutional power; it does not 
expressly confer on Congress the power to create a Freedmen’s 
Bureau. Then, if such a power exist[s], like the power to establish a 
bank, it is an implied power. It is not a ‘substantive, independent 
power,’ for the execution of which other and incidental powers may 
be invoked; but it is itself an incidental power, to be used only to 
execute some other and an express or enumerated power.303 
But as jurists and scholars begin to categorize congressional 
powers as “vast”304 and “inferior”305 after NFIB and Kebodeaux, the 
most immediately relevant materials will be any Supreme Court 
opinions clarifying the doctrine’s contours. The conventional wisdom 
holds that zero majority opinions said much of anything about great 
powers from 1819 to 2012.306 In his recent Harvard Law Review 
Foreword, for example, Professor John Manning claimed that “in no 
case has the Court ever invalidated an act of Congress on the ground 
that it employed a ‘great substantive and independent power,’ in 
contravention of the Necessary and Proper Clause.”307 But if the 
evidentiary lens is widened beyond the narrow linguistic core of 
“great substantive and independent power[s],” noncanonical 
necessary-and-proper cases may nonetheless reveal a Court mindful 
of enumeration’s role in the American constitutional system and 
cautious of sustaining legislation that would destroy the distinction 
between great and incidental powers. 
Consider Afroyim v. Rusk,308 which held that Congress is 
powerless to expunge U.S. citizenship absent voluntary renunciation 
of that citizenship.309 The Court had recently upheld a federal 
expatriation statute as the exercise of a power inherent in 
sovereignty.310 But in Afroyim, the Court sharply reversed course. It 
 
 303.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 934 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis). 
Unfortunately, Senator Davis seems to have misunderstood the idea of great powers: he 
wrongly assumed that a power is not “substantive” and “independent” unless it is enumerated. 
 304.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819). 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  Five such scholarly expressions are cited above. See supra notes 13, 40 and 
accompanying text. 
 307.  Manning, supra note 40, at 59 n.349. 
 308.  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
 309.  Id. at 257. 
 310.  See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (concluding that the ability to expatriate 
U.S. citizens is a “power[] indispensable to . . . functioning effectively in the company of 
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began by insisting that Congress may never exercise a power merely 
because it is thought to be “an implied attribute of sovereignty 
possessed by all nations.”311 “Our Constitution governs us,” and it 
“limits the Government to those powers specifically granted or those 
that are necessary and proper to carry out the specifically granted 
ones.”312 Crucially, Article I enumerates no citizenship-stripping 
power.313 
Could such a power be implied, then? The Court favorably 
quoted Congressman William Lowndes’s remarks from an 1818 
debate on a proposed bill concerning voluntary expatriation: “[I]f the 
Constitution had intended to give to Congress so delicate a power, it 
would have been expressly granted. That it was a delicate power, and 
ought not to be loosely inferred, . . . appeared in a strong light.”314 For 
Congressman Lowndes, “delicate” meant “great”; even the power to 
prescribe the conditions by which individuals could voluntarily 
relinquish their citizenship was too important to be left to implication. 
The Court took precisely this approach as to involuntary 
expatriation. It remarked that “[c]itizenship is no light trifle to be 
jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under . . . implied 
grants of power.”315 The consequences were too important, too grave: 
“In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left 
without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world—as a 
man without a country.”316 It would be “completely incongruous” to 
allow temporary majorities to “forcibl[y] destr[oy]” the bonds that 
unite full-fledged Americans to their government.317 Afroyim’s 
reasoning closely tracked one lawyer’s striking assertion in the 
Harvard Law Review seven years earlier: “The right to destroy the 
citizenship of one of the sovereign people is ‘a great substantive and 
independent power’ within Chief Justice Marshall’s meaning. It is not 
 
sovereign nations”), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); id. (“[T]here can 
be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.”). 
 311.  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 257. 
 312.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1050 (1818) (statement of Rep. Lowndes) (quoted in Afroyim, 
387 U.S. at 260). 
 315.  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267–68; cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 508 (1959) 
(expressing the “Court’s concern that traditional forms of fair procedure not be restricted by 
implication or without the most explicit action by the Nation’s lawmakers”). 
 316.  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268. 
 317.  Id. 
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an incidental power which can reasonably be inferred from a more 
explicit one.”318 
Afroyim demanded more than a “rational nexus” or “relevant 
connection”319 between unwritten means and enumerated ends. 
Rather, involuntary expatriation’s weighty consequences—
“[c]itizenship is no light trifle”320—inspired the Court’s unwillingness 
to imply the power through the Necessary and Proper Clause.321 
Afroyim is, at the very least, a first cousin of McCulloch, NFIB, and 
Kebodeaux. Continued research will likely reveal a much larger 
immediate family than anyone has yet realized.322 
CONCLUSION 
In 2004, Professor Lawson coauthored a marvelous book on the 
constitutional basis for American territorial expansion.323 In it, 
Lawson and Professor Guy Seidman relied on a somewhat permissive 
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause (“the Sweeping 
Clause”324) to deny any constitutional deficiency in the congressional 
annexations of Texas325 and Hawaii.326 The perceived importance of 
annexing foreign land appeared nowhere in their analysis. Instead, 
they reasoned that Congress may admit alien territory directly to 
 
 318.  Leonard B. Boudin, Involuntary Loss of American Nationality, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1510, 1526 (1960). 
 319.  Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 
U.S. 253 (1967). 
 320.  Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 267. 
 321.  One contemporaneous observer drew this very conclusion. See Warren B. Elterman, 
Comment, An Expatriation Enigma: Afroyim v. Rusk, 48 B.U. L. REV. 295, 300 (1968) 
(interpreting Afroyim to hold that “a power of this dimension is unsuitable for implication 
under the ‘necessary and proper’ clause or any other general grant of power”). 
 322.  For starters, Baude has argued that “[w]hen adjudicating modern federalism cases, the 
Supreme Court increasingly invokes a version of the great powers argument, but without a 
thorough explanation (or even obvious awareness) of the roots of the idea it is invoking.” 
Baude, supra note 5, at 1815. 
 323.  LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 111. 
 324.  Id. at 93. 
 325.  See id. at 91 (“[F]ew acquisitions were as constitutionally unproblematic.”); id. at 92 
(“The case for the constitutionality of annexation by legislation is actually quite simple.”); id. at 
93 (“[T]he annexation of Texas by statute was entirely constitutional.”). 
 326.  See id. at 109 (“The only potentially relevant difference between the annexation of 
Hawaii and the prior annexation of Texas was that Texas entered the United States as a state, 
while Hawaii entered as a territory. That is not a difference of constitutional dimension. As a 
matter of domestic American law, ordinary legislation is always sufficient for the acquisition of 
property as long as the acquisition carries into effect a constitutionally granted power, such as 
the admissions power.”). 
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statehood under the literal words of the Admissions Clause, or to the 
status of a federal territory as a means of implementing the 
Admissions power.327 
But in 2013, Lawson published a confession that seems to 
undercut his earlier analyses: “[T]he present author is moderately 
ashamed to admit that he did not understand the import of this 
[“great substantive and independent power”] language until a few 
short years ago, when it was made clear to him by Robert 
Natelson.”328 This crosscutting concept “is an incredibly important 
idea that was in danger of getting lost.”329 Unfortunately, it played no 
role in the most comprehensive scholarly treatment of territorial 
expansion and the Constitution—Lawson’s own book. 
Now that Chief Justice Roberts has restored the great-powers 
concept to the American legal consciousness, the constitutionality of 
annexing foreign territory by statute must be rethought. Opponents 
of acquiring Texas explicitly claimed that statutory annexation was 
too important to be inferred through the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,330 and they proffered a splendid textual and structural defense 
of that position.331 The government’s uniform reliance on 
treatymaking before 1845’s fateful joint resolution only strengthened 
that case.332 And reasoning entirely from first principles, territorial 
annexation is so plainly important—so nation-altering—that it is 
exactly the sort of “great object[]”333 that should not be inferred as 
merely incidental to a more dignified power grant. It is “entirely 
reasonable to expect that power to be dealt with on its own terms.”334 
One need not consider land acquisition to be “particularly 
scary”335 to agree that scholars and judges should know where this 
alluring concept might lead them. Like any constitutional doctrine, 
 
 327.  Id. at 94; see also Palfrey, supra note 111, at 398 (“[I]n no case . . . could it be properly 
said that annexation was so remote from any permissible end of legislation—regulation of 
commerce, for instance, or provision for defence—that it could not have been a ‘necessary and 
proper’ means to that end.”).  
 328.  Gary Lawson, Night of the Living Dead Hand: The Individual Mandate and the Zombie 
Constitution, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1704 (2013). 
 329.  Id. at 1707. 
 330.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 331.  See supra Part II.A.1–.2. 
 332.  See supra notes 198–206 and accompanying text. 
 333.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418 (1819). 
 334.  Baude, supra note 5, at 1754. 
 335.  Koppelman, Health Care Reform, supra note 13, at 118; see Kopel, supra note 24, at 
264 (“[I]t’s only Koppelman who thinks that scariness is part of the test.”). 
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“great substantive and independent power[s]” augurs briar patches as 
well as strawberry fields. Justifying the doctrine’s inevitably 
inconsistent application will be critical to its achieving widespread 
purchase as a judicially administrable principle. But this doctrinal 
conversation cannot flourish unless scholars continue to uncover the 
hidden history of great powers. This Note represents an early effort to 
plot that concept’s parameters. 
 
